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Abstract

This research explored implementing a best commercial practice of establishing
strategic purchasing relationships within the Department of Defense (DOD) procurement
environment. The research was sparked by Air Force Material Command's (AFMC)
instituting a commercial style acquisition strategy using an award term incentive on
several programs. The award term incentive provides for extensions or reductions to the
term of the contract based on contractors' level of performance. Forthcoming
implementation of Air Force FAR supplement 5317.7X, Incentive Term Extension, will
likely increase the number of acquisitions using an award term incentive.
Research findings indicate that management should consider expanding the
AFMC award term guidance to include the model developed from this research, which
identifies decision criteria for selecting the award term incentive strategic purchasing
method. Findings indicate that the acquisition professionals may not have the expertise
or related purchasing skills necessary to establish strategic purchasing relationships for
commercial type performance based services and that training is needed. The researcher
also uncovered evidence that instability and reductions in the DOD workforce affects
acquisition professionals' ability to maintain currency with the changing legal
environment. Further, workforce instability and reductions may influence the
implementation of strategic contractual relationships. The research concludes that
implementing the award term incentive affects the DOD competitive market.

AWARD TERM INCENTIVE CONTRACTING: AN INVESTIGATION OF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE STRATEGIC PURCHASING

I. Introduction
As a foundation for strategic purchasing, this chapter describes budget constraints,
workforce reductions, and acquisition reform initiatives. The new award term incentive
contracting strategy is introduced as well as the traditional method of establishing longterm purchasing relationships. A commercial supplier relationship model and a
conceptual award term incentive model are presented. The research problem, objectives,
questions, and methodology are identified. Finally, the scope and the limitations of the
research are defined.

The Acquisition Environment
Budget Environment. Between 1974 and 1997, the federal government
continually spent more money than it collected. By 1997, the federal deficit was $288
billion, and the total cumulative debt had reached an estimated $5.4 trillion. (OMB,
1999:7) Politicians calling for a balanced budget saw decisive election victories in 1994.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the
Cold War fueled the quest for Department of Defense (DOD) budget reductions as
Congress searched for the elusive peace dividend.
The newly elected Congress targeted defense, the largest category of discretionary
spending in the federal budget, in its advancement toward a balanced budget. Congress

enacted the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA). This act was designed to limit discretionary
spending while ensuring that any new entitlement programs or tax cuts did not make the
deficit worse. The factors below resulted in more tax revenue available to reduce the
deficit.
•
•

The BEA set annual limits on total discretionary spending for defense,
international affairs, and domestic programs.
The BEA created "pay-as-you-go" rules for entitlements and taxes: those who
proposed new spending on entitlements or lower taxes were forced to offset
the costs by cutting other entitlements or raising other taxes (OMB, 1999:10).

The DOD has been coping with declining budgets, both in nominal and real terms for
more than a decade. Defense procurement spending dropped an inflation-adjusted 67%
between 1987 and 1995 (Pare, 1994:96).
Workforce Reductions. Due to the resulting budget constraints between 1993
and 2000, the defense workforce was significantly reduced. The military force structure
was reduced by 29.9% from 936,731 to 656,883. DOD civilian force structure has
decline by 29.4% from 966,087 to 682,286. During the same time, the overall Executive
Branch workforce only declined by 18.2% from 2,188,647 tol, 789,514 (OPM: 2000).
Acquisition Reform Initiatives. DOD acquisition has been the subject of
numerous commissions calling for reform to simplify the process, cut cost, and maintain
or improve mission capability. As listed in a Templin and Heberling article, the
commissions have recommended the following:
1. emulation of private sector buying practices (1983 Grace Commission);
2. decreased use of military specifications (Mil specs) and increased use of
commercial products (1983 Grace Commission and 1986 Packard
Commission); and

3. use of commercial style competition rather than price-based competition (1970
Fitzhugh Commission and 1986 Packard Commission). (Templin and
Heberling, 1994:42-43)
Templin and Heberling report a J. Ronald Fox conclusion from a review of 12 major
studies that attempts to improve the acquisition process have largely been ineffective
until the last decade (Templin and Heberling, 1994). Today, ideas abound regarding
what to change in the acquisition process and how to do it.
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the Federal
Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 are enabling the DOD to find ways to reduce
costs. FARA mandates compliance with 41 U.S.C. 404, which states that governmentwide procurement policies, regulations, and procedures promote economy, efficiency,
and effectiveness in the procurement of property and services by the executive branch of
the federal government.
The 1970 Fitzhugh Commission and the 1986 Packard Commission call for the
use of best commercial practices (Templin and Heberling, 1994:43). Best commercial
practices are those practices that have proven to be successful by the commercial sector
as evidenced by quantifiable cost reductions or gains in competitive advantage that can
be replicated. DOD's implementation of commercial purchasing practices in response to
acquisition reform initiatives was limited until the mid 1990's. A Templin and Heberling
article, which compares the results of three master's thesis research efforts for the Air
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), suggests that using commercial practices and
removing regulatory obstacles enhances the potential for reducing cost (49). Therefore, if

DOD implements the use of commercial practices, the government may finally achieve
real savings in DOD acquisition programs.

Long-term Purchasing Methods
Traditional Purchasing. Priced options have been the DOD's traditional
purchasing strategy used to establish longer-term contractual relationships. The elements
of a traditional purchasing relationship identified by Stuart are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

primary emphasis on price;
shorter-term contracts;
evaluation by bid or arms length negotiations;
many suppliers;
improvement benefits are shared based on relative power; improvement at
discrete time intervals;
6. problems are suppliers responsibility to correct;
7. information is proprietary; and
8. a clear delineation of business responsibility (Stuart, 1993:23)

The priced option strategy is normally implemented through arm's length competitive
negotiations. The basic contract is usually one year with several option years. The
options are unilaterally exercised by the government based on the requirements of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The FAR states that the contracting officer may
exercise options only after determining that 1. funds are available;
2. the requirement covered by the option fulfills an existing government need;
3. the exercise of the option is the most advantageous method of fulfilling the
government's need, price and other factors considered; and
4. the option was synopsized in accordance with FAR Part 5 unless exempted by
5.202(a)(ll) or other appropriate exemptions in 5.202 (FAR, 2000:17.207(c)).
The traditional strategy ignores the impact of the type of item or service being purchased
on the type of relationship needed to execute the program effectively and efficiently.

Further, the traditional method does not link contractor performance to continuing the
business relationship.
New Purchasing Strategy. Due to budgetary reductions, force structure
reductions, and reform initiatives, it is critical to select the appropriate purchasing
strategy in acquiring and managing mission capability. One commercial purchasing
strategy is to reward contractor performance with continuing business. The Air Force
Material Command (AFMC) recently instituted a similar strategic purchasing method on
several programs. This strategic purchasing method is an award term incentive that
provides for extensions or reductions to the term of the contract based on the contractor's
level of performance.
Background. The commercial sector has been consolidating and
downsizing for over a decade. U.S. defense contractors have merged with each other in
an effort to remain competitive (Gregory, 1997). The reorganized companies realized
they did not have the economies of scale to achieve efficiencies for some functions.
Continuing competitive pressure led some companies to contract out services that were
previously performed in-house (Wilcox, 1995:53). DOD's industrial base has
experienced these same competitive pressures. Although the DOD is responding to the
budget constraints and workforce reductions, DOD acquisitions have not generally
occurred in a perfectly competitive market.
Contracting for services is not new; however, the emphasis is growing larger than
just contracting for individual services. Entire departments or functions are sometimes
eliminated and their activities acquired from a supplier. The type of supplier relationship
needed for outsourced functions depends on how close the activity is to the organization's

core competence. "A core competence refers to a skill, process, or resource that
distinguishes a company and makes it unique compared to other firms" (Monczka et. al.,
1998:213). Outsourcing strategies have become central to an organization's overall
purchasing strategy. One definition of outsourcing used in the DOD is "the transfer of a
function previously performed in-house to an outside provider" (DOD, 1996:1).
Sourcing Management. During the beginning of this century, the Air
Force will continue to experience diminishing budgets and shrinking manpower. The
traditional approach of owning a capability or managing a large number of suppliers of a
capability through arm's length relationships is changing to a strategic source
management approach. "Sourcing management involves integrating supplier capabilities
into organizational processes to achieve a competitive advantage through cost reduction,
technology development, quality improvement, cycle time reduction, and delivery
capabilities to meet customers' requirements" (Monczka et. al., 1998:4). Therefore, it is
important to explore the commercial practice of sourcing management to reduce mission
capability cost and to reduce the cost of contract relationship management.
Government Barriers to Strategic Purchasing. Government source
selection practices were found as a barrier in five consolidated studies by Templin and
Heberling and include the following components: award based on price; insufficient
proposal time; set-asides; delay in awards; award to poor performer (inability to reward
good performers); and the solicitation format. Over 90% of the firms found DOD
contracts difficult to understand. This is the top barrier. Tied at 81.8%, the second
highest barriers are price based awards (without past performance) and inability to reward

good suppliers with repeat business (Templin and Heberling, 1994:49). These are serious
barriers to sourcing manag ement within the DOD.
Performance-based Strategy. Leading up to the 21st century, acquisition
reform efforts included rewrites to major portions of the FAR and many of its
supplements. The new DOD policy is to maximize performance, innovation, and
competition. Performance-based strategies for the acquisition of services should be
implemented wherever possible.
As services become an increasingly significant component of what the
Department buys, we must ensure that we acquire them effectively and
efficiently. That is why the use of performance-based acquisition strategies for
services remains among my highest priorities (Gansler, 2000:1).
Prior to the issuance of the new policy, AFMC applied acquisition reform by
awarding several new contracts using a performance-based acquisition strategy to include
an award term incentive provision. This provision allows extensions or reductions to the
length of the contract period based on the performance of the contractor. According to a
briefing prepared by Major Vincent Feck, AFMC, the award term incentive is a:
derivative concept of award fee contracts where the contractor, instead of earning
fee for performance as in award fee contracts, earns additional periods of
performance without having to compete for the award. Award term provisions
provide a method of fostering long-term relationships and rewarding good
performance (Feck, 1999:3).
Award term incentive contracting is the Air Force's attempt at achieving a long-term
strategic purchasing relationship.

Models
A commercial sector supplier partnership model and a conceptual award term
incentive model are described and presented.

Commercial Supplier Partnership Model. The supplier partnership
arrangement establishes an ongoing relationship between strategic alliances. The
mutually dependent relationship requires contract vehicles with longer planning horizons
and performance periods. A strategic purchasing partner is defined here as, "an
agreement between a buyer and a supplier that involves a commitment over an extended
period, and includes the sharing of information along with the sharing of risks and
rewards of the relationship" (Ellram, 1995:10). Figure 1 is a representation of a
commercial supplier partnership model.
Conceptual Award Term Incentive Model. In looking for ways to manage
programs efficiently and effectively, the government is looking to industry's example of
outsourcing. The award term incentive is the Air Force's purchasing method to emulate
the best commercial practice of establishing strategic supplier partnerships. Application
of award term incentive contracting is evolving to reduce risk and increase benefits to the
Air Force. Figure 2 presents a conceptual representation of AFMC's strategic purchasing
award term incentive model. This model depicts impacts from the DOD acquisition
environment including the type of function being procured, the legal and regulatory
environment, the competitive environment, and the capability needs of the reduced
workforce. This research effort is limited to pre-contract award factors of this model.

Research Problem
Forthcoming implementation of Air Force FAR supplement (AFFARS) 5317.7X,
Incentive Term Extension, may increase the number of acquisitions using an award term
incentive provision as a method of strategic source management (AFFARS, 2000). Prior

Phase 1 - Preliminary Phase
• Establish Strategie Need
• Form Team
• Confirm Top Management Support

Phase 2 - Identify Potential Partners
• Determine Selection Criteria
• Identify Potential Partners

Phase 3 - Screen and Select
• Contact Potential Partners
• Evaluate Partners
• Decision

V
Phase 4 - Establish Relationship
• Document Expectations/Contacts
• Provide High Attention Level
• Give Prompt Feedback

Phase 5 - Evaluate Relationship
• Continue at Current Level
• Expand/Build Relationship
• Reduce/Dissolve Interaction

No Adequate
Suppliers:

Retain Effort
In-house

Figure 1: Commercial Supplier Relationship Model (Ellram, 1991: 27)
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Figure 2: Conceptual Award Term Incentive Model
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research has resulted in a model depicting the factors that influence supplier partnerships
for the commercial sector. However, there is no FAR coverage or DOD guidance for
establishing the award term incentive and the commercial model does not address DOD
unique factors.
Purpose and Objective of Research.^ The purpose of this research is to identify
and examine the nature of the factors for establishing and implementing the award term
incentive strategy in DOD suppler relationships. Further, the objective of this research is
to develop an award term incentive model that will assist DOD acquisition professionals
in formulating strategic purchasing relationships.
Research Questions. To guide development of an award term incentive model
the following research questions were developed. Each is described below:
1. What is different about the functional capability of what we are buying that
requires the establishment of strategic contractual relationships using the award
term incentive?
This question identifies how the capability being acquired determines the degree of the
purchasing relationship for the award term model. Near critical items can introduce an
internal competitive element for the procurement of the capability.
2. How are long-term strategic supplier relationships established using the award
term incentive in the public procurement environment?
The information gained from this question identifies the controlling the legal and
regulatory factors when implementing the award term incentive concept.
3. What is the nature of the DOD competitive market when using the award term
incentive?
This question identifies and defines the nature of the DOD market when using the award
term incentive.
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4. What capabilities do the downsized acquisition corps needed in order to plan and
implement the strategic supplier relationship using the award term incentive?
This information identifies areas of training and levels of knowledge or skill need by
acquisition personnel to implement the award term incentive method in DOD
acquisitions.

Methodology
This research is a qualitative case study and comparative analysis. The conceptual
award term incentive model was developed from the commercial literature on strategic
purchasing relationships and expanded to describe the use of award term incentive tool.
The case study was used to identify the factors and describe the complex environment
that influences establishing and maintaining strategic purchasing relationships in the
DOD acquisition environment. A comparative analysis was conducted to examine the
strength of the explanation provided by the new model.
The case study consists of an examination of contractual documents and
interviews with members of five AFMC integrated product teams (IPTs) currently using
the award term incentive tool. A review of Air Force records identified seven contracts
that had implemented this strategic purchasing method. One case used a different tool
than the award term incentive. This case was excluded from this research effort. In a
second case, the acquisition strategy had been revised to eliminate the award term
incentive and was excluded for this research effort. The data was analyzed to find themes
and patterns to describe the new model. The theoretical content of the model was
established through literature review. A comparative analysis was conducted to
determine the validity of the final award term incentive model.

12

Scope and Limitations^ Within the Air Force, only AFMC is currently
developing internal supplemental regulations for award and administration of award term
incentive contracts. Further, Maj Vincent Feck of AFMC/PK initiated a case to
incorporate the award term incentive into the AFFARS 5317, Special Contracting
Methods. Mr. Tim Beyland, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (Contracting) confirmed
that AFMC is the first to implement this strategic purchasing tool. The current
application of award term incentive is fee for services requirements or single award
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity depot maintenance contracts. AFMC is the
primary procuring branch of fee for service and depot maintenance for the Air Force. Due
to these factors, research was restricted to AFMC contracts.

Summary
Although prior research has developed models for strategic sourcing management
for the commercial sector, no such model exists for the Air Force's award term incentive
process of strategic sourcing management. The results from this research develop a
model for strategic sourcing management by establishing performance-based long-term
relationships with suppliers. The model will be used by the Air Force for cost reduction,
technology development, cycle time reduction, and quality improvement. The award term
incentive model was based on the commercial literature on strategic purchasing
relationships and expanded to describe the Air Force tool. This research will add to the
body of knowledge to be considered during acquisition strategy development and
contract negotiations of the award term incentive. The following chapters include a
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review of the literature, a description of the research methodology, a presentation of the
research analysis and results, and a recommendation for future research.
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II. Literature Review

Introduction
Chapter II is a literature review, which initially describes the need for acquisition
reform and the implementation of best commercial practices. This is followed by a
review of the types of supplier relationships and of the types of capabilities acquired.
The strategic purchasing literature review includes purchasing partnerships and strategic
relationships. The chapter provides a discussion of legal and regulatory environment and
of the DOD economic market in which award term incentive strategies operate.
Concluding this chapter is a review of the purchasing skill development literature.

Reform Initiatives Needed
During the early 1990's, many asked why DOD spending was continuing to
increase. The answer is complex, including prior program obligation and commitments
as well as the new requirement to combat simultaneous threats for two major regional
conflicts. The DOD budget was reduced and acquisition leaders told to find savings to
meet the threat requirements. Numerous commissions and studies have found the federal
acquisition process to be slow, cumbersome, and costly. A primary way to achieve some
of the hoped for peace dividend was to reform the acquisition process to emulate the
private sector by incorporating best commercial practices.
The military is continuing to experience diminishing budgets and shrinking
manpower. Therefore, the traditional approach of owning a capability or managing a
large number of suppliers of a capability through arms length relationships is changing to
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a more efficient sourcing management approach. Sourcing management, as defined by
Monczka in Chapter I, requires integrating supplier capabilities into organizational
processes to achieve a competitive advantage through cost reduction, technology
development, quality improvement, and cycle time reductions to meet customers'
requirements. It is important for the DOD to continue implementing commercial
sourcing management practices to reduce mission capability costs and to reduce the cost
of contract relationship management.

Commercial Practices
Public institutions regard the processes and methods employed in the private
sector as commercial practices. However, commercial practices in one industry may not
be applicable to another industry. Some studies have identified practices crossing
industry boundaries, which provide companies with efficiencies not previously used in
the public acquisition process (Templin and Heberling, 1994). Practices that have won
awards or that are better than the current practice are considered best practices, but there
is not a consensus on these descriptions. As identified in the DOD IPT Training Course,
2000, some criteria for assessing whether commercial practices are best are listed below:
•
•
•
•
•

They have proven successful over relatively long time periods.
They usually produce quantifiable results.
They are usually innovative.
They can be repeated, although this is often a most challenging task.
They are not tied to specific locations or industries (DOD, 2000).

The DOD training course indicates that finding methods to implement best commercial
practices to help IPTs achieve specific program goals is more important than identifying
and mandating use of a commercial practice.
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In the late 1980's, the acquisition corps was stagnated in rigid Government rules
and standard operating procedures. The acquisition leaders have become fond of many
best commercial practices and have mandated that some be applied on all programs.
Some practices discussed are EPTs, performance specifications, commercial
specifications, minimization of cost reporting, and the subject of this research, award
term incentive contracting.
IPTs. The DOD leadership endorses best commercial practices that revolve
around the integrated product and process development practice using EPTs. These multidiscipline teams are most effective when there is need for cross-functional
communication. Implementation of joint contractor and DOD evolutionary development
processes and risk management programs are essential to achieving results.
The tools used for implementing risk identification, such as production readiness
reviews, understate the risks present in DOD programs. Ironically, commercial firms with
more technology information still identified some risks as high that need to be resolved in
production; where as DOD program managers, who accept more unknowns and technical
advances, do not assess risks as high. Commercial program managers are motivated and
rewarded to report technology failures early to prevent future profit losses. Many times
DOD program managers find themselves in the role of program advocate and are more
likely to report highly optimistic program outcomes (Christensen et.al., 1999). Although,
DOD is using many of practices from the private sector, the implementation is not
achieving the same results due to the different environment in which the DOD operates.
Performance Specification. Previously, DOD used design or product
specifications that limited contractors' innovation in meeting the Government's needs.
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Performance specifications provide flexibility to the contractor and enhance DOD's use
of best value source selection processes. Risk of performance is shifted to the supplier
and the Government pays a premium for this risk transfer. However, the possibility of
innovative technological solutions may offset this premium in cost savings and value.
Commercial Specifications. Acquiring a capability using commercial
specifications allows DOD to capture the savings and quality associated with a normal
economic environment. By abandoning military specified items for commercial off-theshelf products, the DOD is seeking market quality for a market price. Theoretically, the
quality should be better and the price should be lower than the usual DOD monopolistic
and monopsonistic environment. However, misuse of this commercial practice can lead
to problems. For example, a commercial style contract was awarded sole source using
firm-fixed prices for the C-130J aircraft. The "J" model incorporated the development of
new technologies using commercial specifications and standards. The cost per aircraft
has dramatically increased because of the military unique requirements.
Minimization of Cost Reporting. Submission of cost data is rarely imposed by
the commercial world. Cost information may be shared within an established
commercial supply chain. However, Government acquisition officials have come to rely
on certified cost and pricing data since the passage of the Truth in Negotiations Act in
1962. In many cases, contractors have been forced to maintain two cost accounting
systems. The cost of this expensive proposition is passed on to the Government in the
form of higher overhead rates. The DOD has achieved cost savings from waiving this
requirement. One example is the lowered flyaway cost of the C-17 production aircraft.
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Award Term Incentive. Establishing longer-term strategic relationships for
critical and some important commodity items incentivize industry investment and
performance, while reducing government acquisition lead times and the overall cost of
relationship management. Award term is an effective tool to emulate the long term
strategic purchasing relationship found in the commercial sector where good performance
is rewarded with continued business. An appropriate use of this commercial practice
would be for a service that the government knows it will buy far into the future. The
award term stabilizes demand, which incentivizes capital investment in the capabilities
required. This type of incentive was lacking in previous DOD acquisition strategies.
Other Commercial Practices. Commercial practices can lead to the deployment
of new capabilities faster, better, and cheaper if each unique program assesses which
practices are best for their program. Simpler commercial style contract documents will
encourage commercially innovative firms to do business with the DOD (Templin and
Heberling, 1994). The commercial practice of performance based payments is not only a
way to incentivize performance, but allows for the efficient management of program
technical, schedule, and cost performance parameters.
DOD has heeded the call for implementation of best commercial practices.
Templin and Heberling advanced the understanding of the need for commercial buying
practices in the DOD by distilling information from three industry studies and two
general studies. Their article, and the five previous studies introduced in Chapter I,
identified and ranked important barriers to DOD acquisitions and the benefits that
commercial practices can provide the Government. Reform initiatives resulted from
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studies and from articles such as this one. These efforts laid the foundation for change
for the DOD acquisition environment.

Types of Supplier Relationships
The literature supports the idea that the level of an organization's strategic plan
for purchasing proceeds along a continuum (Fontenot & Wilson, 1997 and Paun, 1997).
Before implementing strategic purchasing procedures, the organization needs to
understand the various supplier relationships. Cavinato proposes a breakout of buyerseller relationships (Cavinato, 1992):
1. Don't know supplier exists. Don't care.
2. Don't know supplier exits. Might use them if I did know, though.
3. Arm's length, price-oriented relationship: high value, low risk of obtaining in
the marketplace, traditional (i.e. taxicab ride).
4. Price relationship; cooperative from time to time (i.e. returning pallets to the
supplier to reduce the price of the next shipment).
5. Price relationship; collaborative over time (i.e. sharing demand forecasts with
suppliers so they can level their manufacturing; helps reduce costs).
6. Total cost relationship; cooperating on total supply chain to reduce total costs
(i.e. providing performance rather than product specifications to supplier so
they can reduce manufacturing costs).
7. Value relationship; linking suppliers to customers to emphasize
product/service value.
8. Joint ventures; complementary relationships uniting strong/weak attributes of
companies.
9. Vertical integration strategies:
a. purchasing capital assets for suppliers;
b. buying supplier and treating as a subsidiary; and
c. complete vertical integration of the capability
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The first three relationships identified are based on price. The supplier reducing
their costs so the purchasing organization can obtain the benefits of those reduced costs
characterizes relationship type 4, 5, and 6. In numbers 7 and 8, the relationships become
tools of strategy to achieve a competitive advantage. Here the supplier is coming
together in an alliance with the procuring organization and with the customer. It becomes
a teaming arrangement with the buyer acting as the coordinator and facilitator to meet the
customers' need. Although the Government does not vertically integrate by owning part
of a private firm, we do provide Government Furnished Property.

Nature of Capability
All acquisition strategies are based upon the type of capability being procured.
Therefore, the type of purchasing relationship depends on the category of the capability.
Kraljic offers a specific way to classify items as discussed below (Kraljic, 1983).
Petrillo provides an integration of the types of relationships and the types of capabilities
(Petrillo, 1998: 54-56).
Critical Capability (high value, high risk). This is the product (or product
component) or service for which the firm is in business; the items that are central to the
firm's distinctive technical capability or core competence. Core competencies are "key"
or "fundamental" capabilities that will provide the firm's competitive edge and basis of
value creation for the future (Freeman, 1990:44). For the DOD, a critical capability
would be the mission of defending the Constitution, the United States, and its interests.
Often there exist only limited sources of criticals, subject to the complexities and
uncertainties of the environment. When procuring critical competencies, the most
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sophisticated partnering relationships are employed. This type of relationship focuses on
customer value as in the relationships of number 7 (value relationships) and number 8
(joint ventures), above.
Commodities (high value, low risk). These products (or product components) or
services are part of the high value items that the firm needs to stay in business. To this
degree, they are like the criticals, except they are readily available in the marketplace.
We expect to see cost reduction relationships associated with these items, as those
described in numbers 4, 5, and 6, above.
Generics (low value, low risk). These are the items the firm needs to operate the
business. They are readily available in the marketplace and have little or no distinctive
qualities. There is little or no risk associated with these items, and not much value to be
gained by distinguishing one from another. We expect firms to try to minimize the time
spent acquiring these products. Firms will try to maintain arm's length, lowest price
relationships for these items, like those described in number 3, above.
Distinctives (low value, high risk). These are items that have been over
specified. They offer no real value to the firm, but create risk due to their high cost and
their unavailability in the marketplace. They are bottlenecks in the supply chain. We
expect firms to be working to identify and eliminate these types of items.
By plotting requirements against concepts of value and risk, an organization can
effectively make strategic purchasing decisions. Candidates for award term incentive
should fall in the high value category for commodity or critical capabilities. Because of
this, the strategies, management approaches, and tactics for commodity or critical
purchases are in agreement with the award term acquisition strategy as expressed in

22

Figure 3. These "relationships tend to be oriented around relatively important purchase
items" (Ellram and Edis, 1996:21).

Strategic Purchasing
Strategic purchasing is characterized by the management philosophy of longerterm contracts. Although there are fewer suppliers, the evaluation and selection process
is intensive and extensive. Because the nature of the relationship horizon is longer,
information systems are established. "The ultimate goal of such an information system is
to make available to all participants in the supply chain all the information needed at the
time" (Meredith and Shaffer, 1999:300-301). Problems are solved jointly and
improvements are sought continuously. A fundamental premise of strategic purchasing is
the equitable sharing of benefits (Stuart, 1993:23).
Purchasing Partnerships. Lisa Ellram offers a managerial guideline for the
development and implementation of purchasing partnerships (Ellram, 1991). The article
correctly forecasted that partnering would continue to expand and dominate the
purchasing landscape throughout the 1990s. More importantly, Ellram asserted that
partnerships would be a source of competitive advantage in most industries.
Difficulties in managing purchasing partnerships led to lessons learned that
confirmed the basic principles of partnering that Ellram suggested. These basic
principles are a) trust, b) communication, c) mutual benefit, d) long-term perspective,
and e) top management support in both organizations. Although the article
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High

Risk

Criticals

Distinctives
• Strategies: Key suppliers;
design to customer or supplier
specifications; provide
product/market differentiation
• Critical factors:
Manufacturing costs high
when cost and/or quality
problems occur; difficult to
source
• Time horizon: Variable
• Management approach:
Simultaneous engineering and
some "Supplier Partnerships"
• Methods: Reduce number of
products and suppliers
• Agreement: Sole Source
Contract
• Tactics: Decrease uniqueness
of products unless
competitive advantage is
gained

Commodities

Generics
• Strategies:
Standardize/consolidate
• Critical factors: Cost of
acquisition
• Time horizon: Up to one year
• Management approach:
Systems contracts; blanket
orders
• Methods: Reduce number of
buys
. Agreement: Purchase Order
or credit card
• Tactics: Increase use of
technology

Low

• Strategies: Strategic Supplier
Partnerships; design to
customer or supplier
specifications; provide
product/market differentiation
• Critical factors: Manufacturing
costs high when cost and/or
quality problems occur; very
difficult to source
• Time horizon: Ten or more years
• Management approach: Supplier
Partnerships
• Methods: Reduce number of
suppliers
• Agreement: Contract or LongTerm Agreement
• Tactics: Increase role of
suppliers

• Strategies: Leverage spend;
preferred suppliers
• Critical factors: Cost of materials
• Time horizon: Five or more years
• Management approach: Volume
contracting, and some Supplier
Partnerships
• Methods: Reduce number of
suppliers
• Agreement: Purchase Order or
Long-Term Agreement
• Tactics: Increase business
volume with fewer suppliers

-Value (cost, service, innovation)-

High

Figure 3: Adaptation of Typology of Capabilities Acquired (Kraljic, 1983)
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specifically identifies these five principles as the foundation of successful partnerships,
subsequent literature suggests that the issue of trust in the buyer-seller relationship is the
cornerstone.
Trust in Partnerships. The meaning and origin of trust in buyer-seller
relationships was investigated by Smeltzer (1997). He identified that there are two views
of trust. Confidence in another's goodwill is the sociological view of trust based on faith
in another's moral integrity. However, the business view of trust is the predictability of
one's expectations based on confidence or risk. From the business view, parties attempt
to mitigate uncertainty of adverse decisions and to control ethical hazards through formal
contractual means such as guarantees, insurance mechanisms, and laws (Ring & Van de
Ven 1994). Hosmer integrates these divergent views into one definition.
Trust is the expectation by one person, group, or firm of ethically justifiable
behavior—that is, morally correct decisions and actions based upon ethical
principles of analysis—on the part of the other person, group or firm in a joint
endeavor or economic exchange (Hosmer, 1995:383).
For this definition to be useful, purchasing professionals must agree on the definition of
ethically justifiable behavior.
Legal Environment
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 implemented the Government's
preference for the acquisition of commercial items and broadened the definition of
commercial items. This Public Law (103-355) established the acquisition policies to
resemble the commercial market place for commercial items and components. In 1995,
Part 12—Acquisition of Commercial Items—was added to the FAR and the DOD's
supplements. Since then, reform of government specifications and standards has taken
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place. In late 1998, the FAR Part 15—Source Selection Procedures—was completely
rewritten. The entire DOD acquisition process is still under going changes to identify,
capture, and implement best commercial practices to manage our supply chain.
Public law continues to support the requirement for socioeconomic programs, the
mandate for competition, and DOD's flexibility to terminate for convenience, which are
industry barriers to DOD acquisitions (Templin and Heberling, 1994). DOD's funding
instability will impact the ability to manage the supply chain. This is especially true for
award term contracts that do not have an exemption from competition.
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act broadened the definition of commercial
items. This and other reform initiatives are allowing wide latitude in trying best
commercial practices and are encouraging the use of performance-based specifications
and commercial standards. However, DOD's priced based competition initiative is
contrary to managing the supply chain as exhibited by the cutting edge of commercial
practices to gain insight through cost based analysis
The award term concept is not covered by regulation and has not been subject to
litigation at this time. When implementing an award term incentive strategy, it is
important for the team to consider the impact of laws and regulations. Some laws and
regulations to consider are economic price adjustments (EPA), the Competition in
Contracting Act (CICA), the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), and the award term clause.
The contractual authority to extend the contract will be a unique award term clause.
Economic Price Adjustment. The FAR does not discuss the renegotiations of
award term prices. However, in the case of fixed-priced options, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) has held that renegotiations of option prices when competition is available
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would constitute a sole source acquisition (Magnavox, 1988). Therefore, it would be
prudent not to renegotiate award term prices. To mitigate the inherent risk in longer term
pricing commitments, the contract should include an EPA clause for fixed-priced award
term incentives as described in FAR (FAR, 2000:16.203). The team must be aware of the
limitation of an EPA clause; for example, it does not cover changes in indirect rates.
Competition in Contracting Act. The draft guidance does not address possible
requirements for a Justification and Approval (J&A) for sole source award of term
extensions. This may occur if the supplier evaluation and selection did not include prices
of all the possible term extensions contemplated by the contract. If all the periods under
the award term extensions were not priced, a J&A would be required by CICA. It is
unlikely that the GAO would consider an unpriced or not-to-exceed priced award term to
be within the scope of the competition. Based upon this assumption, solicitations should
require offerors to propose prices for the maximum award term extension and the
Government should evaluate them during source selection.
Contract Disputes Act. The CDA of 1978, as amended (41 U.S.C.601-613),
establishes procedures and requirements for asserting and resolving claims subject to the
Act. Recently, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that an agency could not write a
contract condition to circumvent the provisions of the CDA (Burnside-ott, 1997). An
example of the result of this decision is the amendment to the FAR for award fee clauses.
Prior to the decision, FAR 16.405(e)(3) required award fee clauses to "expressly exclude
from the operation of the Disputes clause any disagreement by the contractor concerning
the amount of the award fee" (FAR, 1997). This FAR part was renumbered and was
rewritten at FAR 16.406 (e)(3). FAR now requires the award fee clause to "expressly
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provide that the award amount and the award-fee determination methodology are
unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government" (FAR, 2000).
Based on the court decision and on the similarities of the award fee and award term
concepts, the award term decision is subject to the Disputes process.
Award Term Clause. The contract should also specify the initial contract term
or ordering period, as well as the minimum and maximum contract term or ordering
period. The FAR mandates the use of both positive and negative incentives "to the
maximum extent practicable" (FAR 2000:37.602-4). Therefore, the award term clause
should provide for extensions or reductions within the minimum and maximum term. An
award term clause must be incorporated into Section H of the RFP and into any resulting
contract. A sample award term clause is provided in Table 1.
Nature of the Market
Stimulating the push for increased use of commercial practices is the belief that
the free market will allow for the establishment of strategic purchasing relationships
regardless of whether the DOD or a private entity is the buyer. A review of four groups
of theories will examine whether this assumption is true. The four theories—classic
microeconomics, contestable markets, transactional cost economics, and game theory—
all contribute to an understanding of how strategic relationships that the DOD enters into
are established.
Classic Microeconomics Theory. Federal purchasing statutes have attempted to
force-fit the DOD acquisition environment into the classic free-market theory in which
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Table 1: Sample Award Term Clause (AFMC, 2000: 111)
(a) The initial
year [contract term or ordering period] may be extended or reduced,
on the basis of contractor performance, resulting in a(n) [contract term or ordering
period] lasting a minimum of
years from the date of contract award to a maximum
of
years from the date of contract award.
(b) Monitoring of Performance. The contractor's performance against the measures of
merit will be continually monitored by the performance monitors whose findings are
reported to the Award Term Review Board (ATRB). The ATRB recommends award
term points to the Term Determining Official (TDO) who makes the final decision of the
award term points based on the contractor's performance during the award term
evaluation period.
(c) Award Term Plan. The evaluation criteria and associated grades are specified in the
award term plan. The evaluation periods with the associated award term
extensions/reductions and performance criteria with associated award term times are also
specified in the award term plan.
(d) Modification of Award Term Plan. Unilateral changes may be made to the Award
Term Plan if the contractor is provided written notification by the PCO before the start of
the upcoming evaluation period. Changes affecting the current evaluation must be by
bilateral agreement.

(e) Self-evaluation. The contractor will submit to the Contracting Officer (CO) within
working days after the end of each award term evaluation period, a brief written selfevaluation of its performance for that period. This self-evaluation shall not exceed
pages. This self evaluation [will or may] be considered in the ATRB's evaluation of the
contractor's performance during this period.

(f) Award Term Extension. The contract ordering period may be unilaterally modified to
reflect the TDO decision. The total contract ordering period including extensions under
this clause will not exceed
years. If at any time the ordering period or contract term
has
years or less remaining, the operation of the award term feature will cease and
the ordering period will not extend beyond the term set at that time.
(g) Award term determinations and the methodology for determining award term are
unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government.
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market forces set the terms and conditions of the relationship (Gansler, 1989; Heberling
and Graham, 1993; and Peterson, 1987). The Competition in Contracting Act requires the
DOD and other agencies to acquire its goods and services via full and open competition.
This lofty requirement fails to recognize that DOD acquisitions generally occur in a
market characterized by oligopoly, monopoly, or monopsony conditions. The market
becomes less effective as it moves away from perfect competition. For example, as the
number of sellers decreases, the amount of control over the terms and conditions of the
agreement exerted by an individual seller increases (ASPM, 1986: 2-3).
Contestable Markets. Contestable market theorists believe that a market
comprised of a monopoly or oligopoly can still provide the benefits of perfect
competition. A perfectly contestable market is one in "which entry is completely free,
from which exit is costless, in which entrants and incumbents compete on complete
symmetric terms, and entry is not impeded" (Baumöl, 1982:349). Entry and exit barriers
can result from government laws and regulations.
Experts agree that the military industrial base does not operate in a free market.
Many important assumptions of free market economic theory are absent from the defense
market (Gansler, 1989:158-160). One missing characteristic is free entry and exit from
the market, conditions necessary for contestable markets. Another contestable market
characteristic missing is a pool of potential entrants able to respond quickly to a market
opportunity (Bailey and Baumöl, 1984:120-121).
Transactional Cost Economics. Transactional Cost Economics (TCE) is an
interdisciplinary theory combining organizational and economic theory with components
of contract law. The cost of the transaction is the friction that occurs between the parties
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to an exchange (Williamson, 1981). Templin finds there are transaction costs associated
with proposal preparation and with source selection activities that increase significantly
as the number of unique requirements increase (Templin, 1994).
Transaction costs increase for the suppliers to DOD contracts because of the vast
number of unique acquisition laws and regulation. One comparison found it is five times
more expensive to propose on defense solicitations than commercial invitations. Further,
this study found it costs three times more to administer a defense contract than a
commercial effort (Center for Strategies and International Studies, 1993).
Game or Bargaining Theory. Game theory holds that competitors will propose
unrealistic, below-cost prices in an attempt to win a contract. FAR states that a buy-in
occurs when a contractor submits an offer below anticipated costs with the intent to (1)
increase the contract amount after award through unnecessary or over-priced change
orders or (2) receive follow-on contracts at artificially high prices to recoup the losses
experienced in the initial contract (FAR, 2000:3.501-1). Gansler finds that the
Contracting Officer can play the oligopoly game, in which they play the contractors
against one another in an attempt to win promises of high performance, low cost, and
early delivery (Gansler, 1989). Such a strategy further encourages the contractor to buy in, with the intent of later recouping losses.
Heberling and Graham recommend that the DOD must anticipate and counter
contractor pricing strategies to prevent or mitigate buy -ins. The Government should limit
the use of noncompetitive, follow-on contracts by pricing the primary contract and all of
the follow-on vehicles at the award of the initial contract (Heberling and Graham, 1993).
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The competitive pricing of all potential award term incentive extensions is one
mechanism for preventing buy-ins.

Acquisition Corps' Capabilities
The philosophy and roles of acquisition professionals have evolved in the DOD
over the last decade. A recent RAND study illustrates how the philosophy and roles are
changing from transaction oriented to a strategic relationship role (RAND, 1999). Figure
4 identifies and depicts the affect of changing management roles. As the relationship
moves from transaction to strategic based, the relationship becomes more labor intensive
and the number of people needed to manage the relationship increases.
Size and Stability of Work Force. The study identifies that arms-length
transactions are established and executed with few people. However, as the strategic
importance of the relationship increases, the manpower required to establish and execute
the relationship increases. In a study of 100 pairs of buyer-supplier partners, successful
"partnerships tend to be developed by a team, with the full support and cooperation of top
management" (Ellram and Edis, 1996: 21). The intensity of strategic purchasing
"relationships limits the number that can be managed effectively, usually about 1 percent
or less of the purchasers supplier base" (21). This indicates DOD needs to establish
stable teams to implement successful strategic purchasing relationships. Management
should consider the labor intensity of the strategic relationship and the current size of the
work force when implementing strategic relationships.
Strategic Purchasing Skills. Over the past few years, the role of contracting has
begun to play a more significant role in the establishment of strategic purchasing
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Changing Roles
From Transactions to Relationships

Relationships
Purchasing Activities
Problem solving
Market research
Partnering
Global analysis
Requirements definition
Corporate contracts
Risk management
Competitive Advantage
Best value analysis
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Supplier performance evaluation/reporting
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Figure 4: Adaptation of Changing Roles (Rand and Casbon, 1999)
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relationships. Freeman and Cavinato indicate that the human skills of the purchasing
function must be congruent with the strategies of the organization (Freeman and
Cavinato, 1990:7). Therefore management must identify and "tailor its personnel skills
to the needs of the total organization" (10). Historically, the purchasing function was
viewed as clerical and not strategic by some organizations. In a longitudinal empirical
study on strategy development by David Farmer, it was "found that the top managers did
not realize the importance of developing the expertise in the purchasing function"
(Farmer, 1978:7). The acquisition corps for the DOD will need the skills to think
strategically in planning and in establishing strategic purchasing relationships.

Summary
This chapter reviewed the literature that describes the need for acquisition reform
and the implementation of best commercial practices. The description of best
commercial practices provided a discussion of IPTs, performance specifications,
commercial specifications, minimization of cost reporting, award term incentive, and
other commercial practices. This was followed by a review of the types of supplier
relationships and the nature of the capabilities acquired. The strategic purchasing
literature review included purchasing partnerships, strategic relationships, and the
acquisition corps' capability needs for implementing award term incentive. The chapter
provided a discussion of the legal and regulatory environment and of the DOD economic
market in which the award term incentive strategy will have to operate. The four
economic theories discussed were classic microeconomics, contestable markets,
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transactional cost economics, and game theory. Chapter III discusses the methodology
that will be used to collect and analyze the data available.
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III. Research Methodology

This chapter discusses and explains the research design selected for this case
study. A qualitative method was chosen using multiple case studies as well as a
comparative analysis. The three-part research design of sources of data selection and
validation, protections of quality, and data analysis was used to implement the
methodology. An explanation of the relationship between the research questions and the
interview questions is provided in this chapter. Finally, a discussion of the data analysis
process is provided and the research methodology is summarized.

Case Study Design
Although the terms qualitative and case study are frequently interchanged, they
are not synonymous. Case studies can rely on the use of qualitative data, quantitative
data, or a combination (Yin, 1994:14). This method may include a single or multiple case
design. Multiple case studies are undertaken to replicate and/or test a previous study
(45). This means that the data observed are similar across several cases and are used to
draw conclusions. This approach is taken to ensure that the observed phenomenon is not
a rare case. The use of multiple case studies is different from sampling logic in
quantitative studies, where the results of a number of samples are assumed to be
predictive of the entire population (47).
The qualitative method is distinguished by the researcher's interaction with the
subjects while gathering data. Categories derived from the study are not precisely
identified before hand, but the categories emerge with study progression (Creswell,
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1994:7). Information may be verified by observing the pattern in different categories.
This study is characterized by the interactive nature between the researcher and the
subjects in question. The interviews completed by the researcher took place over the
telephone or in person. Follow-up questions were asked immediately to clarify points in
the research. As possible patterns in the data developed, the interview response category
was modified to aid the search for patterns in the data.
The qualitative method is often used to investigate a new topic whose
characteristics are still unknown. This is known as exploratory research and is used
because no model has been developed about the topic (Creswell, 1994:9). "The social
sciences are filled with concepts that are difficult to operationalize for scientific analysis"
(Petrillo, 1998:87). For example, it is easier to discuss supplier relationships than it is to
observe its application or measure its value. Latent variables, such as trust, sometimes
affect the factor but are unobservable and difficult to test quantitatively (87).
Inductive and Deductive Reasoning. Theory or theoretical model based
research cycles consist of a few repeating steps: induction, deduction, and tests. After
testing, the results contribute to another induction, and the sequence begins again. The
induction phase develops general relationships that may explain specific observations.
Deduction derives specific assertions from general principles. Therefore, induction
moves from the level of observation or indicator to the level of theory or constructs.
Conversely, deduction moves for the level of theory to the level of observation (Dooley,
1995: 65-66).
Although commercial strategic purchasing relationships are discussed in the
literature, there is no previous research data available regarding award term incentive
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contracting for use as a basis for this study. Case study methodology has a distinctive
advantage when asking "how, what or why" questions about a contemporary phenomena
"over which the investigator has little or no control" (Yin, 1994: 5- 9). This research
concerns itself with the inductive phase of the research cycle proposed by Dooley and
discussed above. The literature review, document review, and the interview observations
and information collected proposes order to the data through inductive reasoning. As a
result of the researcher/subject interaction required, of the exploratory nature of the study,
and of the inductive reasoning, the qualitative method was chosen as the appropriate
method. This research provides reasonable answers to the research questions and
establishes a model that can be tested in future research.

Sources of Data
The selection of award term incentive contracts was by purposive sampling. In
purposive sampling, the researcher chooses which cases to include as opposed to random
sampling.
Interviews. The cases in this research include interviews with the acquisition
professionals of the entire population of Air Force award term incentive contracts that
were awarded prior to June 2000 and are currently employing the award term strategy.
All of the Air Force's award term incentive contracts were awarded by AFMC. Every
command in the Air Force has different supplements to the FAR. If acquisition
professionals were selected from another command, the internal validity of the
comparative analysis would be weakened. Further, AFMC is the lead command for
procuring logistics capabilities and fee for services. Due to these factors, research will
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be restricted to AFMC contracts. The cases selected were identified using the automated
management information system (AMIS).
Contract Documents. This case study focused on the strategic purchasing
relationship; therefore, analysis of the interactive relationship included the single
acquisition management plan (SAMP), the award term clause, the award term plan, and
other documents in the government contract files.
Literature. Literature and archival sources of data such as books, journal
articles, professional magazines, regulations, contract documents, and contract files
relating to the commercial strategic purchasing method and to the award term incentive
were analyzed.

This effort was undertaken to discover the characteristics and

relationships of Air Force strategic purchasing. This enabled the researcher to look "for
constructs that bring order to the descriptive data and that relate these data to other
research findings reported in the literature" (Gall et al., 1996:549).

Protections of Quality
A case study methodology, like all research designs, needs to ensure standards of
quality are met for construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability
(Yin, 1994). Actions to assure quality in each area are discussed below.
Construct Validity. Two tactics that Yin (1994) recommends to ensure construct
validity are used in this research effort. First, data is collected from multiple sources to
facilitate a triangulation of converging lines of inquiry. Triangulation of data sources and
of theory-based perspectives on the same data was accomplished where possible. A
second tactic used is to establish a chain of evidence. Yin recommends case study
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database development. Further, the research report should cite relevant portions of that
database:
The principle is to allow an external observer or reader of the case study, for
example—to follow the derivation of any evidence from initial research question
to ultimate case study conclusions (98).
Construct definition, validity and measurability is sharpened through an iterative analysis
of the evidence for each construct (Eisenhardt, 1989:533). This was achieved by
conducting within and between case analysis. The comparative analysis conducted
further strengthens operational construct definitions (Cooke and Campbell, 1979).
Internal Validity. Internal validity deals with establishing a causal relationship—
where certain conditions lead to other conditions (Yin, 1994:33). Internal validity would
not normally be applied to an exploratory study such as this. However, the resulting
model does reflect proposed causal relationships between variables or factors that were
identified. Pattern matching helps establish that inferences about data collected are
correct. Between case pattern matching strengthens internal validity (109-111).
Explanation building through iterative comparative analysis between cases builds internal
validity (111). Comparison of the new model to literature with similar findings links the
phenomena. This strengthens the internal validity and raises the findings to a higher
conceptual level (Eisenhardt, 1989: 544).
External Validity. External validity deals with the generalizability of the
findings from the cases in this study to other cases. To strengthen external validity of this
research, multiple cases were studied (Yin, 1994:45). A comparison to the literature
sharpened the external validity (Eisenhardt, 1989:533). Analyzing data within the
framework of several established commercial strategic purchasing models contributes to
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the external validity of the research (Ellram 1995; Landeros, Reck and Plank, 1995;
Stuart, 1993; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Watts and Hahn, 1993).
Reliability. Reliability demonstrates that another researcher using the same data
collection procedures and the same cases could find the same results. "The goal of
reliability is to minimize errors and biases in the study" (Yin, 1994:36). Yin recommends
that a case study protocol and database be used to ensure the final quality criterion of
reliability. Organizing and documenting all the information in a study database markedly
increases the reliability of the research (95). Case study procedures for this research were
documented in the protocol and study database that are discussed in the next section.

Data Analysis
Participants in the research were informed of the goals of the study. Participants
were guaranteed confidentiality in order to encourage open, honest discourse during
interviews. Data collected was known in detail only by the researcher and advisors
(Schmitt and Klimoski, 1991).
Protocol. In a qualitative study, the researcher is considered the primary
instrument of data analysis (Creswell, 1994:45). However, to organize data gathering, a
protocol or form is needed. The protocol for this research is an open-ended set of
questions designed to allow a natural flow of conversation. The cases in this research
were investigated using the same protocol, which aids in identifying patterns in the data.
The protocol includes the following two forms: the initial telephone contact guide at
Appendix A and the interview guide at Appendix B.
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To ensure each contact was informed of the same information, the researcher used
the initial telephone contact guide. A set of basic questions was addressed during the
interviews and while reviewing the literature and documentation. The questions act as
reminders to the researcher of the data to be collected, as recommended by Yin (1994).
Schmitt and Klimoski characterize interviews as "conversations with a purpose"
(1991:139). The questions addressed to research participants are open-ended and
dynamic in order to facilitate rich discourse. The interview questions were initially
mapped to the study's research questions as follows:
Research Question 1: What is different about the functional capability of what we
are buying that requires the establishment of strategic contractual relationships
using award term incentive contracts?
1. What is the capability or function that is being procured using award term
incentives?
2. Is the item unique to DOD?
3. What are the risk and criticality of the capability or function?
4. Is this function being outsourced? If yes, is this function considered a near
core competency and why is it being outsourced?
Research Question 2: How are long-term strategic supplier relationships
established using the award term incentive in the public procurement
environment?
5.

What contract type was used and why?

6. How does the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) at 41 U.S.C. 253
and FAR subpart 6 affect the solicitation, selection, and management of
the award term incentive process? CICA requires contracting officers to
promote and to provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers
and awarding public contracts.
7. How does the Service Contract Act at (4) U.S.C. 353 (d) which provides
that contracts that are subject to the Act may not exceed 5 years affect the
solicitation, selection, and management of the award term incentive?
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8. How does the Anti-deficiency Act affect the solicitation, selection, and
management of the award term incentive process? Specifically, what is the
affect of government unique appropriations, authorizations, and funding
limitations?
9. How does the Truth-in-Negotiations Act affect the solicitation, selection,
and management of the award term incentive process?
10. What other laws or regulations that affect the solicitation, selection, and
management of the award term incentive process?
11. Were any unique terms and conditions incorporated in the contract? If
yes, what and why?
Research Question 3: What is the nature of the DOD competitive market when
using the award term incentive?
12. What characterized the market for this acquisition?
13. Did the supplier operate in a competitive market?
14. Did the supplier have a competitive edge?
15. Does the solicitation or the contract contain organizational conflict of
interest provisions? If yes, why was it necessary? Did it affect the
competitive market?
16. Was there a potential for a buy-in?
17. What steps, if any, were taken to prevent a buy-in?
Research Question 4: What capabilities do the downsized acquisition corps need
in order to plan and implement the strategic supplier relationship using the award
term incentive ?
18. What role did the participant play in the case?
19. How long has the participant served in the current position?
20. How much experience does the participant have in related areas?
21. Has the participant used an award term incentive before?
22. How often are team members transferred?
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23. Has the Term Determination Official changed since award of the contract?
24. Has the participate received or provided award term incentive training?
Database Coding. Notes were kept during data collection in the field and on the
telephone. Data points collected from each document or interview were reduced to
separate computerized note cards. All note cards from a single source were coded (A-l01 through E-4-24) to maintain linkage with the data source. The alpha code references
the case. The middle number refers to the research question. The last two-digit number
refers to an interview question associated with that case.
Analysis Coding. Initially, three types of analysis coding were used during
different stages of the investigation (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). These coding types were
open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. Open coding was used to categorize the
data, which is similar to developing descriptive statistic. Building on the open coding,
axial coding developed connections between the cases. To help assess the overlapping
information between categories the variables from the open coding and the axial coding
were pattern coded and evaluated across the cases in support of the selective coding.
Selective coding was used to synthesize the information into the new model.
The coding process used a method called mind-mapping (Buzan & Buzan, 1993).
This type of radiant thinking allows thoughts to generate in all directions from a central
idea, where every idea becomes the nucleus of a new group of ideas. This technique is
known as concept-mapping in the psychological literature and is explained as
metacognitive (Novak, 1998). According to Novak, metacognative learning transpires as
a person obtains a broad strategy that assists learning or comprehending new information.
The mind mapping strategy was beneficial in assembling the information within the cases
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(open coding), in detecting emerging phenomena between the cases (axial coding), and in
maturing a model to explain the phenomena (selective coding). The results from the
mind-mapping process will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
Variable pattern coding was employed to support the selective coding between
cases. This allowed the researcher to refine the definition of the constructs identified by
open and axial coding. Pattern coding identified variables that cross between the focus
areas, which provided a transition to the selective coding to build the model. A refined
association of the pattern coded variables to the research question and the operational
definitions developed by this research area identified in Appendix C.

Comparative Analysis
A comparative analysis was conducted between the award term strategic
purchasing model and the literature. One of the purposes of this research is to identify
the factors for implementation of strategic purchasing relationships within the DOD. The
comparative analysis examined the strength of the explanation provided through the
award term model that was not addressed by the AFMC award term guide.

Summary
The primary aim of this exploratory, qualitative case study was to develop a
model that can help explain the award term incentive strategic purchasing tool. This
study attempts to identify the characteristics and examine the factors for strategic
contractor relationships using award term incentive contracts. The research was
stimulated by the recent acquisition strategy direction provided by the Secretary of the
Air Force, Principle Assistant Deputy for Acquisition to implement the commercial
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practice of rewarding performance with a continuing contractual relationship.
Additionally, this investigation was motivated by AFMC's FAR counsel Case 00-03 for a
change to AFFARS regulation and by AFMC's new award term guide.
Several steps were taken to ensure the quality of the research. Five contract
actions using the award term incentive were researched. The multiple-case study design
and the use of broad investigative questions facilitated discovery of compelling and
robust findings. A comparative analysis was conducted to determine whether the data fit
the model better than the AFMC guide document.
Results of this exploratory research are reported and analyzed in the next chapter.
The findings will facilitate future research that will be possible after the award term
incentive tool has been fully executed. Further, the results will assist decision-makers as
they continue to develop policy guidance necessary to ensure successful implementation
of this best commercial practice. The next chapter introduces the results of the within
case analysis and presents the results of the between case analysis and of the new model
comparative analysis to the literature.
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IV. Results and Analysis

This chapter presents the information gathered and the detailed analysis
performed on the five acquisitions of this exploratory research. This research identifies
the unique factors the DOD acquisition workforce will experience when implementing
the award term incentive method of sourcing management. This chapter is divided into
four major sections beginning with an overview of the data collected and analyzed. The
within case analysis is briefly introduced. This is followed by the results of the between
case analysis section including an emergent model. Concluding this chapter, selective
coding refines the emergent model into the development of the analytical model. The
model is supported by a discussion of the case analysis findings and a comparative
analysis to the literature.

Overview of the Data
A review of AFMC files resulted in the identification of five cases currently using
the award term incentive acquisition concept. Case information was gathered from
interviews and document reviews. Most of the information was gathered from personal
interviews with government contracting officers and contract negotiators through field
visits, telephone communications, and electronic mail communications. However, some
information was gleaned from program and contract file documentation such as the single
acquisition management plan, the award term plan, the award term clause, and the
contract.
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Within Case Analysis
This section consists of a sample of the analysis resulting from one of the five
cases studied. The complete results of all five within case study sections, one for each of
the programs reviewed can be found in their entirety in Appendix D. Each section
addresses only the information gathered from that particular program. The within case
analyses are addressed in no particular order of importance. The presentation of each of
the within cases follows a uniform and set format. Each case is divided into a
background section and into four focus sections. The background section provides
general information about each program, the dollar value of the acquisition, the contract
length, and the experience level of the contracting professionals. The four focus sections
are Nature of the Capability, Legal and Regulatory Environment, Nature of the DOD
Competitive Market, Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. These sections were developed
from the four research questions.
1. What is different about the functional capability of what we are buying that
requires the establishment of strategic contractual relationships using award term
incentive contracts?
2. How are long-term strategic supplier relationships established using the award
term incentive in the public procurement environment?
3. What is the nature of the DOD competitive market when using the award term
incentive?
4. What capabilities does the downsized acquisition corps need in order to plan and
implement the strategic supplier relationship using the award term incentive?
The information in the four focus sections was open-coded using concept/mindmapping techniques (Novak, 1998:27 and Buzan & Buzan, 1994:139). A pictorial
representation of the resulting map is presented for each within case analysis. A sample

48

of the Nature of the Capability section for Case D follows. The sample mind map for the
Case D analysis provides a quick overview of the type of analysis completed for each
case in the research effort.
Case D.
Nature of the Capability. This program procures availability of pilot
training simulation services. The simulation service is provided on an individual
simulator and is linked locally to same aircraft type simulators. The service provides the
capability to be linked long haul through a network provider to other same aircraft type
simulators and to be linked long haul through a network provider to different aircraft type
simulators. These services were determined to be of a commercial type and procured
under FAR Part 12. DOD is currently the only customer of this service. However, there
is a potential FMS market for this type of simulation service. This is because of the
unique training required such as flying in formation, air to air tactical mission training,
and evasive maneuvers. There does not currently exist tactical training except in the
aircraft.
Procuring availability of simulation type training as a service reduces the risk
associated with training in the aircraft. In fact, significant portions of the training will be
completed solely in the simulator. Simulators provide training with destructive weapons,
in high-risk maneuvers, and in interoperability at reduced cost of training in the aircraft.
Previously we own the trainers, now we are contracting for the availability of the service.
The interviewee indicated that having trained pilots to fly missions is near the Air Force
core competence to perform the mission.
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Figure 5: Sample Case D Open Coded Mind Map
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Commercial
Procedures

The suppliers have the technical expertise or can hire subject matter experts to
provide the simulation service. By removing the government from the process, the
supplier can implement concurrency upgrades much faster as we no longer have the
manpower. Further, there was no development and procurement money available to
maintain concurrency or to meet the new interoperability training requirement.

Between Case Analysis
This section is divided into six major parts; the four focus area parts developed
from the research questions, summary of the pattern coding, and the emergent model.
The evolving ideas from across all the cases are synthesized into descriptions of the
phenomena regarding each research question. Axial coding developed connections
between the cases. The variable pattern coding identifies overlapping information among
the focus areas used for the selective coding. The between case analysis results in the
refining of the conceptual award term incentive model into emergent model.
The within case analysis open coding was accomplished using mind mapping
techniques. To compare ideas across cases, axial coding was also accomplished using
mind maps. In this phase, the four focus areas were placed in the center of the map.
Then the ideas for that focus area were taken from each of the five open coded mind
maps for the individual cases. Each idea radiated from that center point. The radiant
thinking technique allowed the researcher to organize the ideas without being prejudiced
by the sequence or strength with which they were presented by the different interviewees.
The number of ideas that evolved from these mind maps are more complex than
those from the within case analysis. The mind maps were useful for data analysis, but
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became burdensome for presentation purposes. Therefore, a summary of the data across
the five cases was necessary. Table 2 cross lists the ideas regarding each of the four
focus areas and presents them in tabular form. In this table, one can easily see the ideas
emerging. For example, concerning the nature of the capability procured, the notion that
type of capability procured affects the need to use the award term incentive for sourcing
management is evident across all cases. The ideas from the maps were develop into an
emergent model that describes the phenomena regarding the questions. This emergent
model is presented at the end of this between case analysis section.
Nature of the Capability. This first focus area attempts to identify what is
different about the capability being procured that requires a long-term contractual
relationship using the award term incentive. All five of the cases identified the
capability to be very near the AF core mission. All five of the cases involve the
procurement of services. The five cases determined the benefit or value of the
relationship exceeded the cost of implementing the strategic relationship for these high
dollar value services. Four of the cases clearly involve acquisition of leading edge
technology services that do not exist in the AF today. Case E acquires a service to
maintain current technology. Except for Case E, the other cases involved reducing risk to
mission performance.
Three of the cases procured the service to replace previous government ownership
of the assets. Case C procured a privately operated network service other than the
government owned network. Case E considered the possibility of outsourcing the
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capability through a private/public competition and no longer owns all the facilities and
equipment to support the assets. Four of the cases were determined to be of a
commercial type and Case C was determined to be government unique. Of the five cases,
only Case E's service was clearly available in the commercial market place. However,
each case had aspects to varying degrees of a commercial service and to varying degrees
of a government unique service or of a government unique application.
Legal and Regulatory Environment. This second focus area attempts to
identify the controlling laws and regulation in the establishment of strategic purchasing
relationships using the award term incentive within the public procurement environment.
In all five cases, actions were taken to avoid ADA violations, to comply with the CICA,
and to comply with SB A requirements. Various government or program unique terms
and conditions were incorporated by all five cases. Cases C and E understood the SCA
five-year performance limitation does not apply to award term incentive clause. Cases A,
B, and D misapplied the SCA five year performance limitation and plans to mechanically
limit the number of terms on the contract at any given time. Even if the supplier has
earned additional terms, terms will not be added until only 4 terms remain on the
contract. Cases A and D have included the SCA implementing clause and Department of
Labor (DOL) Wage Determination (WD). A DOL WD was inappropriately applied to
Case B, however, the contract is being modified to remove this requirement.
The type of capability being procured was determined to be government unique
for Case C. Therefore, Case C contracted by negotiation under FAR 15. Cases A, B, and
D followed FAR 12 acquisition of commercial item procedures. Case E's private
offerors competed under FAR 12 procedures, but the public offeror was required to
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comply with portions of FAR 15 procedures. All of the cases, except Case C,
inappropriately exempted the Term Determining Official's decision from the disputes
process.
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. This third focus area attempts to
identify how the implementation of the strategic purchasing relationships using the award
term incentive strategy affects the market we procure from. Ironically, the four cases for
services deemed to be of a commercial type with government unique aspects had a
limited number of suppliers. Of these four cases, a commercial market for the service
existed for Case E. Case C had a large number of suppliers for the service that was
determined to be government unique with commercial aspects. There is a commercial
market for Case C's service. Further, the competition for three of the cases' commercial
services was large business DOD contractors or a team of small business contractors.
The competition for the Case E commercial service was a large business DOD contractor
team and a public offeror with a large business DOD partner. The suppliers for the Case
C government unique service were large and small business suppliers with a commercial
business base.
Four of the cases involved high start-up cost and one case involved high proposal
cost. Cases A, B, and D had government certification barriers and high financial risk.
Case E had labor knowledge barriers and high financial risk to private suppliers. The
Case C had low start-up cost and few market entry barriers. One DOD imposed market
entry barrier for potential suppliers under Case C was the inclusion of an organizational
conflict of interest (OCI) clause. There was clearly a competitive advantage for the
awarded suppliers for Cases A and D. The interviewee for Case E asserted there was no
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competitive advantage between the public team and any private teams. There was clearly
no competitive advantage for the awarded suppliers for Cases B and C.
The first four cases are managing risk by shifting it to the supplier. Case E
attempted to shift the performance, schedule, and cost risk. Certainly, the closing base no
longer manages this risk, but the government still bears this risk for the portion of the
service provided by the new public provider. All five cases indicate the pricing or not-toexceed (NTE) pricing of potential award term periods reduces the potential for supplier
buy-in. Using the award term incentive to shifting technical and cost risk reduced
supplier buy-in all five cases.
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. This last focus area attempts to identify the
affects force structure reduction has on DOD's ability to plan and to implement long-term
relationships using the award term incentive. In all five cases, none of the contracting
professionals had received any award term incentive training. Only the contracting officer
for Case C had prior experience using the award term tool. The contracting professionals
in Cases C and E were experienced in buying services. The interviewees in Cases A, B,
and D had no services buying experience. Their experience was with supply contracts.
The contracting professionals in Cases C and E were experienced in using ordering type
contracts. The interviewees in Cases A, B, and D had never used indefinite
delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) or ID requirements ordering contracts. Their
experience was with systems or subsystems definitive contracts. Except in Case E, none
of the contracting professionals had experience using commercial procurement
procedures.
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There was an indication by all the acquisition professionals that a broader base of
experience is needed in the related procurement processes when using the award term
incentive. Further, they indicated that additional training is needed as the number of
services and commercial type procurements increase. In one case, the interviewee
confessed that the limited training provided for commercial acquisitions was inadequate
due to the lack of experience of the trainers. In Case C, the contracting professional has
provided formal award term training to the TDO. In Case E, the contracting professional
has provided informal training by sharing document with other organizations and has
conducted evaluation process training for award term evaluators. In four of the cases, the
contracting professionals were unaware of the FAR changes regarding the CDA under the
similar award fee concept. In all cases, the professional indicated a lack of time to stay
current with the dynamic DOD acquisition regulations.
In Cases A, B, C, and D, members of the IPT were reassigned due to government
downsizing. In the same four cases, members of the IPT were promoted to other
positions left vacant by early retirement incentives or normal attrition. Core members, of
Case E's IPT remained stable throughout the selection process for the largest award term
incentive contract implemented. However, the IPT for Case E experienced 100%
turnover within the first year of contract administration. Case E's IPT will be
experiencing another large change in membership when the base closes. Some members
of the IPT will choose not to relocate.
Pattern Coding. The overlapping information among the categories of the
variables identified with the open and axial coding was pattern coded to assist the
researcher. Table 3 summarizes the pattern coded data across the cases. The ideas from
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Table 3: Summary of Pattern Coded Data
PATTERN
CODES
Core/Near
Value
CC
CT
CTO
ROAsset
Sub Asset
ROFE
Ser
Comm
Uniq
Comp
SCA
FAR 12
FAR 15
Mult-KT
Lim-KT
NTEP
EP
TINA
CICA
CJ&A
OCI
TforC
ADA
A-Fund
A-Appro
ID/Req
ID/IQ
SBA
PPC
SB/SDB Plan
Dis-A
UniqTC
Cont-Bus
F-B&P
Fin-R
Tech-R

CASE A

CASEB

CASEC

CASED

CASEE

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
Some Data
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
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X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 3: Summary of Pattern Coded Data(Continued)
I-B&P
R-Buyin
Leg Reg
Sm#Sup
Lg#Sup
LgBus
SmBus
LgBusT
SmBusT
DODSup
PubSup
ComBusB
NComMkt
HSC
LKB
DP
BC
PR
CT
OT
ST
AT
CE
OE
SE
AE

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X
Poor Qual

X
Poor Qual

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

the within and between case analysis were used in pattern matching and selective coding
for the emergent model as well as the final analytical model in the next major section.
Emergent Model. The within and between case analysis results identified
overlaps of information among the four focus areas. For example, if the nature of the
capability is a commercial type then this variable overlaps the purchasing skills needed to
procure commercial item. The model shown in figure 6 began to emerge. It reveals a
relationship flow between the four focus areas. Following the same example, a
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Acq Corps'
Capabilities
Need stable Team
Experience or training
needed: award term,
ordering contracts,
service contracts, and
commercial procedure
Changing force
structure needs revised
purchasing skills
management

Nature of the Capability
Rapidly changing
technology
High benefit and value
Commercial or govt
unique
Core or critical to meet
mission
Competitive

Legal and
Regulatory
Environment
Appropriation and
Authorization, CICA,
TINA, SCA, ADA,
FAR 12, FAR 15,
Contract types

Nature of the A/T
DOD Comp
Market
Advantages and
disadvantages
Types of offerors:
number, size, DOD
or non-DOD

Award
Term Incentive
Strategic Supplier
Relationship

Figure 6: Emergent Model
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commercial type item determines the use of FAR 12 procedures. The use of FAR 12
procedures lowers the entry barriers to conducting business with the DOD. Therefore,
the type of capability flows through to the establishment of the strategic purchasing
relationship.

Comparative Analysis of the Analytical Model
This section contains two major parts, the analytical model and the comparative
analysis. The model is a pictorial description of the phenomena regarding the research
questions. The comparative analysis section discusses the results of the findings, of the
case data, and of the comparison to the literature in support of each module of the model.
Analytical Model. Selective coding was used for model building, which is the
application of selected parts of the data. This was an iterative process, returning each
time to the within case analysis, to the between case analysis, and to the literature. This
part provides an overview of the master flow chart and presents three sub-charts. The
master flow chart describes the overall award term strategic purchasing model. Three of
the major modules explode into individual sub-charts.
The master flow chart in figure 7 contains 13 modules. The first five modules
leading to the sixth module identifies decision criteria for selecting the award term
strategy. Specifically, modules three, four, and five are associated with the first research
question regarding what is different about the capability being acquired that requires a
strategic purchasing relationship.
Module seven is associated with the fourth research question regarding what
capabilities does the acquisition corps need to implement the award term strategy. If the
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acquisition corps experience or skills are insufficient then module eight directs the
reviewer to proceed to figure 8. Figure 8 provides recommendations and guidance for
developing the acquisition corps strategic purchasing skills. This figure is discussed in
the comparative analysis part of this section.
Module nine is associated with the second research question regarding the
establishment of strategic purchasing relationships using the award term concept in the
public procurement environment. Module nine directs the reviewer to proceed to figure
9. Figure 9 provides a detailed plan for evaluating the controlling legal and regulatory
authority and award term unique application. This figure is discussed in the comparative
analysis part of this section.
Module 10 is associated with the third research question regarding what is the
nature of the DOD competitive market when using the award term incentive concept.
Module 10 directs the reviewer to proceed to figure 10. Figure 10 identifies market
advantages and disadvantages of implementing the award term incentive concept.
Further, this figure provides a detailed plan for determining the competitive market. This
figure is discussed in the comparative analysis part of this section.
Module 11 directs executing the determined source selection procedures. Module
12 directs establishing the contract using an award term incentive clause and an award
term plan (ATP) using the AFMC award term guide which provides detailed examples.
Further, the guide provides step-by-step instructions for administering the evaluation
process identified by module 13. Modules 11 through 13 are identified as part of the
model, but were not measured by this research. Therefore, modules 11 through 13 will
not be discussed further.

64

o
o
u<
<*
-*.
,>->
Jt3

u on
c
o u
<u C3
a,
CO H
CT o -a
u
< CU
o

&
-^ rr
"
o
O <

"a
M

4>

5*-i

x> o
oo .2 n.

<+-<

—

-

o
U

c/:
Ü

CO

t>0

-a
Z

<

OO

hn

c
c/l

CO
X!

n
ÖJI

em

H

4_,

s

<U

13

cr <u
o <u
< OH
Ivl E
o
O

£t3ü

C

UH

r

c "
g£üa

Cu

3

O

>
Q

H XI
CÜ

^

'-H

c
do c
o CO—
H

OH

—-

< o S

uä^

u

£

T)

u

<!>
<\>
Z

<L>
'U

&
O
U
ö

o

<
do
<D
i-i

T>
<i;
(i)

3
00

>>
M-i

&
U

3
CT
O

3

o

X)

V

^ ^
< £
C/3

^H

B

o
U

K)
;-H

J

c -5

ÖI)
O

o

<i>

OH

^

4
T
4_i

(U

> 00
c
00 c

dTerm
.wpafb
K/pkp/

<u

u
<

uo

I
; !
oo-^

<u

-t—'

ci;

<

O

X)
CT

c <i)
CD tx
~oH X
^ W

o a
H g

^

/

c

00

OH 3

T

ti—i

O

^ °°

"N

/■

>

'n

rri
O.

m

U
>
U2

C

fa

i-

o

<u

04
tfc

S
*

UH

H

&H ön
<a ~p c
C3 <

< g

C3

;-*
c
o

•a .£ la.
b
Kt P
^ t-c S

U

S P
U u
£ W

65

<u

K!
U<
(JXJ

our
Tncl
war

O -w

o >? *

HiSz

O

Ui
2H

m o < o>
V " —

racts
ilabi
use/
Ü

B

<u
"2
3 3 T3

u-

H

1)
3 C/>
IT 3
«J
(J

P

u

a\ v.

.

Ö ag
IS <
(^

8 a 5H

C S — UH

I-*

<C -=• 3

y fe

v_

/"

I

4->

O

H

u >

* <:
B
O B
•*^ u
4) CS
a •_
B
o ©
u V

<u <C

.3" a)
3

<
»5
"Ö (U -a
o o
S
o
es .y >
< «
o
O
« >

>>

2^

s

~^
O* r^ <
t^ & Q

The ID Req
ntractual Veh

£ .2
r9 "3

fi
,F
\

1)

2 S

_y

o
£
c

<C oo
CL,

U

^ £
H

<■>

g
° e
feu

°o

OH

PH

fc

«

<o
Q
O
P
H

,

■

+J

y

^

Ö

<J1

sc

-4J

3
ft
<»
Q

c/3
3
KJ

Fi

u

PH

o

V-i

ft

öß
(U

»5

CO

t-t

&

c
o
U

<c

o
IN

Ö

<
'S

bO
<D

)

Q
O
Q
6\
<u
3

o

eu

<l> *T3
fl) T) (J
^ 3
3
C/5 C 3

>n

S 2 o

C/3

O

C/3

Q

£

< U
O
U
> r/i < Q
(i) n u
oo
L0

1)

on

66

Award Term
Master Flow
Chart E lock:

bfl

rdTer
rbject
Limit

I

o

4—1

S
<u u
H X
T) W
^

o
U

m V.

o
'>
c
W

f
Q

a

3
00

<4-H

o

*

«5

03

4)
O
3

o

OH

co

00

CO

c^J

H

&

£ m

t
T3
(1)
r»

3
T3

'S
3

o
PH

3
00

CO

3

Q
O
Q
3

o P3 O

£

/

£
n
o

r^

p OH c«
U <*i

V

3

6 o

V

to U u
£ 00 F

on .a

CQ

o
n

Q

a
C *-■
co

3
[L, 00

3

00
DO 6U
-1 l-l

c
o
U

CO

£

*

e
00

Q
O
Q

^
vS

3

ÖJ)
3
<D 00

>->

UJ

3

m

Q

V

n

Pi ">

3

w

O
Q

4
T

f

\

£

/

c
o o

*l ^

«4-<

"H

<D
03

X,

th
c

>00

■4-»

ii

3H
OH

R<

3
00

o
U

if
o
U

a
(Sj
o
nj

3

o
0)

(

o
V

I

f

« o

cu

3
00

4-1

*
E

3
O

00

as -C
•4-»
4)

Q

CO

3

o 1-0

CO

<D

Q
O
Q

3 .3

bi) <U

a<L) a,
£
o
00 U

Q
CD
Q

3

3
O

5
Q
O

a

V

1

z'

3
00

Q
O
Q

<4-c

o

*

s
00
o

67

V

CO

3

03
(so
J

Comparative Analysis. The second part of this section provides a comparative
analysis of the cases and of the literature associated with each of the modules of the
master flow chart of the model. Further, this section provides a comparative analysis of
the three sub-charts of the model. The results and findings for the model follows the four
focus areas developed from the research questions. However, the order of the four focus
areas follows the order from the master flow chart.
Nature of the Capability. The first module of the master flow chart asks
is a strategic relationship needed. From the literature review in Chapter n, if the item is
determined generic or if the relationship is based on price then a strategic relationship is
not needed (Cavinato, 1992; Fontenot & Wilson, 1997; Kraljic, 1983; and Paun 1997).
Therefore, move to module two and do not use the award term incentive.
Proceed through the award term decision criteria if the need for a strategic
relationship is affirmative. The third module asks is the capability a core or near a core
competency to execute mission critical efforts. The literature supports not implementing
a strategic relationship for commodity capabilities, where the relationship focuses only on
cost reduction efforts (Cavinato, 1992; Fontenot & Wilson, 1997; Kraljic, 1983; and
Paun, 1997). In four cases studied, the capabilities are near a core competency in support
of mission critical capabilities. For example, Case C provides long-haul network
capability allowing pilot and crew training between multiple weapon system platforms in
direct support of the Expeditionary Air Force deployment concept. Case E is a core
competency, but is outsourced because of government reductions in capacity.
The fourth module asks is there an on-going competitive nature for the capability.
The DOD awards long term, sole source contracts for critical and distinctive capabilities
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where there is not an on-going competitive market. It is not that the DOD is over
specifying these items, but the nature of the capability is leading edge, military only
technology. An example is the stealth technology for major weapon sy stems. Some
other type of incentive other than award term incentive should be considered for noncompetitive distinctive and critical capabilities. The literature supports limiting the use
of sole source, follow-on contracts by pricing the primary contract and all of the followon vehicles at the award of the initial contract (Heberling and Graham, 1993). The ongoing competitive nature of the capability with the potential for the continuing the
business relationship develops a competitive advantage for the buyer (Templin and
Heberling, 1994 and Ellram, 1991). The capabilities for all five cases researched have an
on-going competitive nature. This is supported by the fact that Case C's technology has a
commercial application, Case E's service is commercially available, and Case A, B, and
D's technology is of a commercial type.
The fifth module asks does the high value of the relationship provide sufficient
benefits to offset the cost of the relationship. The five cases' values ranged between
$131.9 million and $10 billion over a 15-year period of performance. In all five cases,
the potential savings from cost reductions, technology development, cycle time
reductions, and quality improvements was determined to exceed the additional cost
associated with establishing and maintaining a strategic purchasing relationship
(Monczka et. al., 1998). The Chapter II literature review supports judiciously
establishing strategic relationships where the value to the customer exceeds the cost of
the relationship (Cavinato, 1992; Ellram and Edis, 1996; and Rand and Casbon, 1999).
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Responding yes to the decision criteria modules results in a determination to
employ the award term incentive for the acquisition at module six. Module seven asks if
the acquisition corps is stable and has the strategic purchasing capabilities. If unsure of
the answer, proceed to the eighth module, which directs the viewer to figure 8.
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. The first module of figure 8 is a
restatement from the master flow chart. The second and third modules are
recommendations regarding the identification and development of strategic purchasing
skills within the acquisition corps. As cited in Chapter I, Mr. Gansler identified
performance based service acquisition as the fastest growing procurement method in the
DOD and as one of his highest priorities. However, the skills to accomplish this type of
acquisition are not identified nor have the purchasing skills developed within the ranks of
the remaining members of the acquisition corps. The literature identifies that the skills of
the purchasing function must be congruent with the strategies of the organization
(Freeman and Cavinato, 1990,7). Management must identify and "tailor its personnel
skills to the needs of the total organization" (10). As supported by findings in the
literature, management appears to be unaware of the importance of developing strategic
purchasing skills (Farmer, 1978).
The interviewees in the cases indicate they performed extensive research to gain
the knowledge required for implementing the award term concept. Due to downsizing,
the remaining members of the acquisition corps have less time to maintain currency with
the changing regulations. Their inability to remain current is exemplified by the fact that
following extensive research four out of the five cases inappropriately excluded the
award term decision process from the disputes process in the award term clause. The
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finding from this research recommends mandatory just-in-time training before
implementing an award term strategy.
The fourth module recommends management identify and commit a stable core
IPT for the planning and implementation of strategic purchasing relationships. Phase 1 of
the commercial supplier relationship model identifies forming a team with top
management commitment as a factor for developing a successful relationship. Review of
the literature in the development of this model identifies internal uncertainty as
negatively influencing the development of the relationship (Ellram and Edis, 1996: 22).
Case E received management support to maintain core IPT stability during the source
selection. However, within a year from award of the contract the team experienced
complete membership turnover. The other four cases report extreme instability in core
IPT membership. In the four years since the start of acquisition planning for Case A, this
program has had four different contracting officers, four different program managers, two
different contract negotiators, and one engineer. Since award of the contract, the Term
Determining Official (TDO) for the award term has changed twice. The interviewees in
the other four indicate instability impacts efficiency and effectiveness in implementing a
strategic purchasing relationship.
The fifth module directs the IPT to identify acquisition specific training needs.
As there is no DOD regulatory guidance for award term, Air Force personnel should
review the AFMC Award Term Guide, as well as, the training briefing provided at the
web site within module 6. The guide provides an example of the award term clause and a
detailed plan for developing and executing the award term plan. If this guidance had
previously existed then four out of the five cases would not have exempted the award
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term decision from the disputes process. Module seven identifies a National Contract
Management Association one-day seminar on award term contracting as another source
of training. Module eight records the completion of award term training.
The AFMC Award Term Guide identifies the ID/requirements and ID/IQ
contractual vehicles as the most appropriate types when implementing the award term
concept (AFMC, 2000). Module nine requests the IPT to identify the need for this
training. A few of the acquisition professionals interviewed had experience or training in
the use of ordering contracts. All other interviewees prior experience and training was in
the use of definitive contracts. Module 10 records the completion of ID requirements or
ID/IQ training. The training for these types of ordering contracts is more extensive than
award term and is outside the scope of this research.
Module 11 requests the IPT to identify other skills needed for the specific
acquisition. Information from the cases indicates the acquisition corps does not have
adequate experience or training in services and commercial contracting procedures. The
AFMC product centers procurement focus is in the acquisition and maintenance of
government unique major weapon systems and subsystems. AFMC has not focused on
the acquisition of services or commercial type items.
Module 12 records the completion of commercial acquisition procedures training.
FASA's redefinition of commercial to be of a type, not necessarily commercially
available, increases the likelihood that procurements using the award term strategy will
be following commercial procedures. Cases A, B, D, and E employed commercial
procedures with the award term strategy. Of those four cases, only Case B indicates
receiving training in commercial contracting procedures and assesses the training as
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inadequate because the experience base does not exist in the government. The
interviewees insinuated that the trainers lacked actual experience and were unable to
provide the level of detail needed to develop this strategic purchasing skill. The training
for commercial procedures is more extensive than award term and is outside the scope of
this research.
Module 13 records the completion of service acquisition training. Using award
term in conjunction with the procurement of supplies is acceptable. However, all five of
the cases are for the procurement of services. Only Cases C and E acquisition
professional had any experience using service contracts. The newly appointed
contracting officer for Case B has service contracting experience, but the prior
contracting officer did not. Inadequate training resulted in the misapplication and
misinterpretation of the SCA five-year length limitation. Cases A, B, and D misapplied
the SCA five year performance limitation and plans to mechanically limit the number of
terms on the contract at any given time. Even if the supplier has earned additional terms,
terms will not be added until only four terms remain on the contract. The training for
service contracting procedures is more extensive than award term and is outside the scope
of this research.
The interview information indicates that implementing the award term concept
using the newly available training is not difficult. However, without the related
purchasing skills, acquisition professionals report loss of efficiency and effectiveness to
plan and implement the award term strategic relationship. Therefore, the finding of the
research recommends management identify as a top priority the development of ordering,
of commercial procedures, and of service purchasing skills within the acquisition corps
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under the strategy purchasing skills module three. Module 14 directs returning to the
master flow chart at module 9.
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The ninth module of the master
flow chart directs the viewer to figure 9. The first module identifies that figure 9
provides a detailed plan for evaluating the controlling legal and regulatory authority with
award term unique application. The second module identifies that the appropriation type
matches the length of the award term extensions or reductions. It is important to
understand that the constitution provides that "...no money shall be drawn from the
Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law" (Steamer, 1992). All five of
the cases provide extensions in the same length as the appropriation type. This helps
ensure the order periods will match the appropriation type.
The third module identifies the use of ID requirements and ID/IQ contractual
vehicles assist program administrators to avoid Anti-deficiency Act (ADA) violations.
Single award "ID/IQ and requirements contracts allow additional contract terms to be
added without committing future fiscal year budget before it is appropriated" (AFMC,
2000:8) These two contractual vehicles avoid violating the ADA because the government
does not incur an obligation until the order is issued. However, the ID/IQ does obligate
the government to order the minimum order quantity to establish consideration for
contract establishment (FAR, 2000:16.5). The ID requirements contract incurs no
minimum obligation as exclusivity of the contractual arrangement establishes contractual
consideration. These contractual arrangements are used "when a recurring need is
anticipated" (16.5). All five of the researched cases use these two contractual vehicles to
reduce the risk of an ADA violation.
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The fourth module identifies the need to ensure the contract is clear that the
government's obligation with regard to award term extensions is conditioned upon the
availability of funds or availability of funds for the next fiscal year clauses. All of the
contract cases incorporate these clauses to help avoid ADA violations. The AFMC
guidance is consistent with this recommendation (AFMC, 2000:8).
The fifth module identifies the requirement to comply with the CICA at 41 U.S.C.
253 and with the FAR part 6 requirements. CICA requires contracting officers to
promote and to provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding
public contracts. The sixth module asks if this is a competitive acquisition. If not
competitive then move to module seven and process a sole source J&A to include all the
award terms (FAR, 2000:6). If this is a competitive acquisition, move to module eight
and answer if all the award terms were competed. If not, move to module nine and
process a class J&A to defmitize the award terms in a sole source environment (6). All of
the award term periods are competitively awarded in four of the cases. Case C has a class
J&A pending to defmitize the award terms in a sole source environment.
Modules seven, eight, and nine proceed to module ten, which asks if the
procurement is a supply or a service. If this is a service, module 11 notifies the viewer
that the contract term is not limited to 5 years. This is consistent with the understanding
of the contracting officer in Case C and an iterative review of the literature. Specifically,
James Barager's, Col, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Contracting) Assistant
Secretary (Acquisition), understanding of the Services Contract Act (SCA) is the
rendition of services beyond the five years for an additional period for effort not included
in the original five year base period is considered a wholly new contract (Barager, 1992).

75

This understanding is with respect to the application of Section 4 (d) of the Act's
provision. Deputy Assistant Administrator of the US Department of Labor(DOL), Mr.
Daniel Sweeney, confirms this understanding as long as no single extension period if
greater than five years (Sweeney, 1992). Cases E and C are for services but the type of
effort is not subject to the SCA. Cases A, B, and D are subject to the SCA and have
included the appropriate FAR clauses and attached the DOL wage determinations to the
contract as indicated in module 12. However, the interviewees indicate they are limiting
the addition of award terms to no more than five years at any given time in order to
comply with the five year limitation. The acquisition professionals for three cases are
unaware of the DOL's interpretation that extensions are not subject to a five-year
limitation.
From module 12 or module 10, module 13 asks if the capability is government
unique. If yes, proceed to modules 14 and 15 to conduct source selection using
negotiated procedures with multiple contract types available for implementation (FAR,
2000:15 and 16). Case C's contract used the negotiated procedures with cost
reimbursement, time and material, and firm-fixed price (FFP) contract types. If this
procurement is a commercial type then proceed to modules 16 and 17. The controlling
regulation is the FAR 12 procedures with FFP or FFP with economic price adjustment
(EPA) type contracts (12 and 16). "Including an economic price adjustment clause helps
mitigate the inherent risk in longer term pricing commitments," (AFMC, 2000:8). Cases
A, B, D, and E were FAR 12 procurements using FFP EPA type contracts.
Module 18 identifies the requirement to include a termination for convenience (Tfor-C) of the government clause and other government unique clauses. While the AFMC
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guide discusses the affect of T-for-C using award fee, it does not provide a discussion
regarding T-for-C using award term (AFMC, 2000:36). However, the NCMA Award
Term Contracting Seminar identifies that the T-for-C "will probably affect the
motivational power of the award term incentive" (NCMA, 2000: 2-13). All of the cases
incorporate the T-for-C and other government unique clauses. An example of a
government unique clause was used in Case C. To be considered for award, the offerors
had to agree to the inclusion of an organizational conflict of interest (OCI) clause. This
clause is required because the supplier for Case C is establishing standards and defines
the network interface requirements for the other simulation service suppliers. Further, the
network supplier can be a technical advisor in future simulation services source
selections.
Module 19 identifies program unique clause. A program unique clause for Case
C is the Defense Information Service Network (DISN) clause. This clause allows the
Government to direct the supplier to provided the connectivity using DISN. The change
would to be negotiated using this clause as the authority. Another example of a program
unique clause is found in Case E, which includes a workload volume guarantee allowing
the supplier to submit a request for equitable adjustment if the volume changes greater
than plus or minus 25 percent. The most notable program unique clause in all five cases
is the award term clause. The AFMC award term guidance now provides suggested
language for an award term clause, which is provided in Chapter II at table 1 of this
document.
Module 20 identifies that the award term decision is subject to the Contract
Disputes Act. Based on review of the literature from a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
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decision and on the similarities between the award fee and the award term concepts, the
award term decision is subject to the CDA (Burnside-ott, 1997, FAR 1997, and FAR
2000). However, four out of the five cases exempted the award term decision from the
disputes process in the award term clause. Module 21 directs returning to the master flow
chart at module 10.
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. The tenth module of the
master flow chart directs the viewer to figure 10. The first module identifies that figure
10 provides a detailed plan for determining the competitive market when using the award
term concept. The second module asks are there market advantages or disadvantages
when using award term incentive. The third module identifies that using the award term
incentive increases the strength of the competition. Because of the potential for earning a
continuing business relationship, the interviewees in all five cases indicate that
competition was increased. For example, teams of suppliers competed for the award in
all five cases in order to gain competitive advantages of the skills of the combined team.
The literature of Ellram asserts that partnerships will be a source of competitive
advantage in most industries (Ellram, 1991).
The fourth module identifies that an advantage to implementing the award term
incentive is reducing the potential for suppliers to buy-in. All five cases believe the
pricing or NTE pricing of the award terms reduces the potential of a buy -in. The
literature of Heberling and Graham supports findings that by pricing the follow-on effort
at award of the initial contract reduces buy-ins (Heberling and Graham 1993).
The fifth module identifies that an advantage to implementing the award term
incentive is reducing the suppliers' future bid and proposal cost. Further, potential source
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selection cost and time savings are forecasted for both the government and the supplier.
This is supported by the transaction cost literature reviewed in Chapter II (Center for
Strategies and International Studies, 1993 and Templin, 1994).
The sixth module identifies that using the award term incentive decreases the
strength of the competition. After losing a competition with an award term incentive,
suppliers may abandon the DOD market. Suppliers may come to believe that the loss of
a long-term contract essentially shuts them out of this market. "The consequent reduction
in competitive vigor in the market could lead to higher prices or costs for services, or to
poorer quality performance" (NCMA, 2000: 2-4).
The seventh module identifies that using the award term incentive increases the
supplier's technical and financial risk. Commercial suppliers are guaranteed a revenue
stream, which encourages capital investment. Appropriation law does not allow the
government to guarantee revenue streams. Except for Case E where the public offeror is
the supplier, suppliers have increased financial risk. Increased supplier technical risk to
maintain concurrency or technical order changes was found in all the cases. All the cases
identify the nature of the longer-term relationship also increases technical and financial
risk on the supplier.
The eighth module identifies the DOD legal and regulatory environment as a
disadvantage that decreases the strength of the competition. Gansler finds that the
invisible hand of the market may not work for even the most standard commercial items.
Some competitors can not be bothered with the red tape imposed by the regulations
(Gansler, 1989). Templin finds there are transaction cost associated with proposal
preparation and with source selection activities, which increase significantly as the
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number of unique requirements increase (Templin, 1994). Transaction cost increase for
the suppliers to DOD contracts because of the vast number of unique acquisition laws and
regulations. An example from the cases is the OCI clause in Case C. Research found the
OCI clause caused potential offerors not to propose because it would limit future
simulation services opportunities.
The ninth module identifies that the increase in the initial bid and proposal cost
and the additional cost and time to support the DOD source selection process decreases
the strength of the competition. One comparison from the literature found it is five times
more expensive to propose on defense solicitations than commercial invitations (Center
for Strategies and International Studies, 1993). Case E reports that several potential
suppliers chose not to propose or to join a team of suppliers because of the large cost of
proposing.
The AFMC guidance states, "determining when and how to apply award term
requires a thorough understanding of the market and the acquisition situation," (AFMC,
2000: 7). The results of this research identifies several questions to help acquisition
professional define the DOD competitive market. Module 10 asks if there is a
commercial market for the capability. Module 14 asks if the capability is a commercial
type. Modules 11, 15, and 18 ask if there are high entry barriers to the market. An entry
barrier is an action or condition that prevents other firms from entering the market.
Depending on the answers to these questions, modules 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 identify
the expected number of suppliers in the market, the expected sizes of the supplier firms,
and the expected suppliers' past DOD experience.

80

If the capability to be acquired is commercially available with low entry barriers
then the acquisition professional should expect a larger number of suppliers, consisting of
large or small businesses, and DOD or Non-DOD suppliers. The described market
conditions in module 12 exist for Case C. Although, Case C had a few government
unique aspects, the network technology is commercially available with low entry barriers.
If the capability to be acquired is commercially available with high entry barriers
then acquisition professionals should expect a smaller number of suppliers, consisting of
large businesses, and DOD or Non-DOD suppliers. Market conditions described in
module 13 are the market conditions for Case E. Case E had a few government unique
aspects, the engine maintenance technology is commercially available with high entry
barriers. The entry barriers include a skillful and knowledgeable workforce, license
maintainer by the original equipment manufacturer, and facilities and equipment
acquisition.
If the capability to be acquired is not commercially available, is of a commercial
type, and has low entry barriers then acquisition professionals should expect a large
number of suppliers. However, the number of suppliers would be less than that of
suppliers whose capabilities have a commercial market. The expected market consists of
large or small businesses, and DOD or Non-DOD suppliers. This is the market condition
for module 16.
If the capability to be acquired is not commercially available, is of a commercial
type and has high entry barriers then acquisition professionals should expect a small
number of suppliers. The expected market consists of large businesses, and DOD or
Non-DOD suppliers. The market conditions described in module 17 are the market

81

conditions for Cases A and D. Case A's and D's technology is for pilot training services
is commercially available for government unique application with high entry barriers.
The entry barriers include government controlled simulation certification and high initial
capital investment.
If the capability to be acquired is not commercially available, is not of a
commercial type, and has low entry barriers then acquisition professionals should expect
a small number of suppliers. However, the number of supplier would be less than those
of suppliers whose capabilities have a commercial market or are of a commercial type.
The expected market consists of large or small businesses, and DOD suppliers. The
describe market conditions describe in module 19 are the market conditions for Case B.
Although the capability was determined to be of a commercial type, the current
contracting officer could not understand how this was determined. There is not a
commercial market for this type of mission crew training or a known type of commercial
mission crew training service. Case B is a government mission crew simulation service.
While pilot simulation technology is commercially available, there is no commercial
equivalent mission crew training. The entry barriers were low. The initial capital
investment is lower than pilot simulation services and does not require flight-worthy
simulation certification. However, the government unique capability requires knowledge
of the aircraft platform.
If the capability to be acquired is not commercially available, is not of a
commercial type, and has high entry barriers then acquisition professionals should expect
a small number of suppliers. The expected market consists of large businesses, DOD
suppliers. This is the market condition for module 20. Module 21 directs the viewer
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back to block 11 of the master flow chart. The remaining modules of the master flow
chart are as previously described.

Summary
This chapter presented an overview of the data collected and analyzed, briefly
introduced the within case analysis, and presented the between case analysis with an
emergent model. The majority of this chapter was devoted to the presentation of the
analytical model developed from this research and to the comparative analysis of the
model. Chapter V presents the significant conclusions drawn from this analysis, the
limitations of this research, and recommendations for future research.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

This research was undertaken in response to the problem statement that there is no
FAR coverage or DOD guidance for establishing the award term incentive and the
commercial model does not address DOD unique factors. The purpose of this research
was to identify and examine the nature of the factors for establishing and implementing
the award term incentive strategy in DOD suppler relationships. Further, the objective of
this research was to develop an award term incentive model to assist DOD acquisition
professionals in formulating strategic purchasing relationships.
The framework for the case studies was developed around four research questions
that were derived from a review of the strategic purchasing literature. The analytical
model developed from this research is consistent with the AFMC guide. Further, the
analytical model expands the guidance of the AFMC guide. It is clear from the
anecdotal, archival, and literature evidence that guidance is needed for effective and
efficient implementation of the award term, performance-based strategy.
Strategic Purchasing Conclusions
Implementation of best commercial practices is streamlining the DOD
procurement process. However, it is necessary to recognize that development and
execution of a strategic purchasing relationship is more labor intensive than arms-length
transaction relationships. It is apparent from a review of the literature and from the study
of the cases that top management and the acquisition corps needs a greater understanding
of strategic purchasing relationships in order to implement the award term incentive
judiciously.
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Nature of the Capability. The type of capability being acquired is different from
DOD's past acquisitions. The DOD is buying capabilities that are core competencies or
near core competencies for achieving mission critical activities. The Government is
purchasing these capabilities in the form of performance-based services. We no longer
own the assets or own the facilities and equipment in support of the assets. The
capabilities researched are of an on-going competitive nature. The capabilities are of a
commercial type as defined by FASA or are available commercially to varying degrees.
These capabilities provide access to risk reducing, leading edge technologies. The
capabilities are of a high dollar value, where the additional cost of the relationship is
offset by the value of the benefits.
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. Mr. Gansler identifies performance-based
service acquisition as the fastest growing method of procurement in the DOD and as one
of his highest priorities. However, identifying the strategic purchasing skills or
implementing a strategic purchasing skills development program to accomplish these
types of acquisitions has not previously occurred. The literature and this research
identify that the skills of the purchasing function must be congruent with the strategies of
the organization.
The past structure of the acquisition workforce within AFMC has resulted in
specialization of procurement skills for systems and subsystems supplies. This segment
of the workforce does not have the necessary experience and training in service
procurements, in order contracting procedures, or in commercial acquisition processes to
effectively and efficiently implement the related award term incentive contracting tool.
Further, implementation and administration of the contractual relationship using the
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award term incentive tool is impacted by the DOD's base closure and downsizing efforts.
This research identifies that IPT instability results in a loss of efficiency and of
effectiveness within the acquisition corps.
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The entire DOD acquisition process is still
under going changes to identify, capture, and implement best commercial practices to
manage our supply chain. The award term concept is not covered by regulation and has
not been subject to litigation at this time. When implementing an award term incentive
strategy, it is important for the team to consider the impact of government unique laws
and regulations. This research results in a detailed plan for evaluating the controlling
legal and regulatory authority with award term unique application.
The complex and dynamic nature of the legal and regulatory environment requires
special attention in implementing the award term incentive. To avoid ADA violations, the
acquisition professionals must understand appropriation law in selecting the contractual
vehicle and clauses for an award term contract. Complying with CICA requires
competitive pricing of potential award terms or a J&A for sole source pricing. The
current interpretation of the SCA does not limit award terms to five years. The
acquisition corps must remain current with implications of changes in laws and
regulations. For example, a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that no contract
term or condition may limit a suppliers access to the disputes process. Therefore, the
award term clause cannot exempt an award term decision from the disputes process.
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. Implementation of the award term
incentive strategy affects the nature of the DOD market. Advantages of implementing
this strategic purchasing method includes: increasing the strength of the competition,
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reducing the potential for supplier buy-in, reducing supplier future bid and proposal cost,
and reducing future source selection cost and time. Disadvantages of implementing this
strategic purchasing method includes: decreasing the strength of future competition,
increasing supplier financial and technical risk, limiting competition from the DOD legal
and regulatory environment, increasing the instant procurement bid and proposal cost,
and increasing the instant source selection cost and time.
This research results in a detailed plan for determining the competitive market.
Although the supply or service may be commercially available or categorized as a
commercial type, the government unique aspects of the supply or service influences the
number, the size, and the type of company's willing to do business with the DOD.
Government market entry barriers also influenced suppliers' competitiveness for DOD
procurements.

Limitations
This research is limited by the exploratory nature of the subject area. Prior to this
research, there were only commercial models describing the planning and the
implementation process for strategic purchasing. The data available for identifying and
examining the nature of the factors for establishing and implementing the award term
incentive strategy in DOD suppler relationships was confined to Air Force AFMC
programs and personnel. Unfortunately, these data sources limit the validity of the
research.
The research is limited in that it does not represent the full scope of the
participants in the award term process. Interview data from suppliers may be
forthcoming as the execution of the award term incentive strategy gains acceptance.
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Expanded data sources would increase the validity of this research. Further, examining
data from only one Air Force Command limits the ability to generalize the conclusions of
this research to other Air Force Commands and to other military services.
A single researcher conducted these case studies. Potential for researcher bias
exists. Evaluation of these cases by another researcher using the same protocol would
increase the reliability of the conclusions drawn from the findings.

Recommendations for Future Research
A goal of this exploratory research was to develop a model for acquisition
professionals to use in the planning and the implementation of the award term strategic
purchasing tool. The resulting model should be submitted to AFMC in hopes of eliciting
comments to improve the model for incorporation into the AFMC Award Term Guide.
Further, the results of this exploratory study should be submitted to the NCMA to share
this body of knowledge with the contracting community. This study provides a
foundation for expanding the NCMA Award Term Contracting seminar to include a
discussion of strategic purchasing, of the acquisition corps' capability needs, and of the
DOD competitive environment.
The limitations previously discussed provide several recommendations for future
research. Future research should include a validation of the preliminary findings of this
research. This could include an analysis of the same cases and protocol used in this
research effort. Other future research could include an analysis of these cases with an
expansion to include other cases from other military services to increase the ability to
generalize the findings.
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Related research areas not addressed by this research effort include: identifying
methods for determining the value of the strategic purchasing relationship, identifying
methods for evaluating award term in source selection, and identifying the factors for
executing the award term evaluation process. Researching methods for determining the
value of the strategic purchasing relationship includes the identification of the cost and
benefit factors. This research would develop a mathematical model for use in the
cost/benefit analysis determination.
Currently, source selection procedures do not provide for the dollarization of the
probability of the contract being extended by the award term incentive. The award term
periods are evaluated with the assumption that all award terms priced will be earned.
This research would develop a mathematical model for use in the source selection
decision. However, this potential research would have to include an examination of the
controlling laws and regulations.
The AFMC Award Term Guide provides excellent instruction for the
development of award term plans and for the execution of the supplier performance
evaluation process. While intuitively appealing, the actual effectiveness of previously
implemented contractual incentives such as award fee is anecdotal. Future research
should include an empirical study of the effectiveness of the award term incentive.
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Appendix A: First Telephone Contact with Primary Point Of Contact

Introduction
Rachael Harris
Master student at AFIT
Also a Contracting Officer at ASC Wright Patterson AFB
First Conversation
...this is regarding research I'm conducting on the award term incentive
"If you have the time now, I'd like to tell you a little more about my research.
Would you be willing to allow me to visit your office (or schedule a time), talk with you
and some of your colleges, and use the information as part of my master research?"

I got your name and number from Maj Vincent Feck of AFMC/PKP. He
indicated you are working with a contract that has an award term incentive.

About the Research
This research is to identify how to establish a long-term relationship using the
newest performance base strategy. I would like to compare your experience using award
term with other acquisition professionals.
Research Objective
Identify and examine the nature of the factors in DOD for implementing this
strategic relationship. From this information, I hope to develop a model to assist others
using the award term concept.
What I Require
I will e-mail you an interview guideline that will include the questions and the
interview process.
1. Meet with you and your colleges to review your contract files for strategy and award
term documents.
2. Background on the program and the acquisition professionals using the award term.
3. Nature of the capability you are procuring
4. What the competitive market was for your program
5. How you are applying the laws and regulations
6. What kind of turnover rate has the team experienced
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I expect that we'll spend a few hours talking, followed by me reading documents or
reviewing my notes. Please set aside time for any follow-up questions.
Particulars
Date and time of visit or teleconference

Thank you so much for you help.
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Appendix B: Interview Guidelines

Background Information
Name
Organization^
Job Title
Years in Position
Years in Organization
Years in Acquisition

Interview Questions
The following questions provide information the researcher sought through the interview.

1. What is the capability or function that is being procured using award term
incentives?
2. Is the item unique to DOD?
3. What are the risk and criticality of the capability or function?
4. Is this function being outsourced? If yes, is this function considered a near
core competency and why is it being outsourced?
5. What contract type was used and why?
6. How does the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) at 41 U.S.C. 253
and FAR subpart 6 affect the solicitation, selection, and management of
the award term incentive process? CICA requires contracting officers to
promote and to provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers
and awarding public contracts.
7. How does the Service Contract Act at (4) U.S.C. 353 (d) which provides
that contracts that are subject to the Act may not exceed 5 years affect the
solicitation, selection, and management of the award term incentive?
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8. How does the Anti-deficiency Act affect the solicitation, selection, and
management of the award term incentive process? Specifically, what is the
affect of Government unique appropriations, authorizations, and funding
limitations?
9. How does the Truth-in-Negotiations Act affect the solicitation, selection,
and management of the award term incentive process?
10. What other laws or regulations that affect the solicitation, selection, and
management of the award term incentive process?
11. Were any unique terms and conditions incorporated in the contract? If
yes, what and why?
12. What characterized the market for this acquisition?
13. Did the supplier operate in a competitive market?
14. Did the supplier have a competitive edge?
15. Does the solicitation or the contract contain organizational conflict of
interest provisions? If yes, why was it necessary? Did it affect the
competitive market?
16. Was there a potential for a buy-in?
17. What steps, if any, were taken to prevent a buy-in?
18. What role did the participant play in the case?
19. How long has the participant served in the current position?
20. How much experience does the participant have in related areas?
21. Has the participant used an award term incentive before?
22. How often are team members transferred?
23. Has the Term Determination Official changed since award of the contract?
24. Has the participate received or provided award term incentive training?
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Method of Data Collection
In addition to discussions with acquisition team members , I will review whatever
documentation you can provide such as the acquisition plan, solicitation, award term
incentive contract provision, award term performance evaluation plan, and buyer/supplier
correspondence.
I will set aside two mornings (0800-1200) for the face-to-face or telephone
interview. After the initial discussion, I will review whatever written materials you can
provide. Follow on discussions will address questions that may arise from this review.
For the validity and reliability of this research, I must address all the above
questions. However, discussions will be allowed to take their natural course according
to the availability of respondents, information, and documentation.

Follow-up
It will likely be necessary for me to make follow-up calls to respondents to clarify
information during the data analysis process. To ensure accuracy on the part of the
researcher, once the case is written-up it will be sent to the respondents for review prior
to publication.
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Appendix C: Pattern Codes
Table 4

PATTERN
CODES
Core
Value
CC
CT
CTO
ROAsset
Sub Asset
ROFE
Ser
Comm
Uniq
Comp
SCA
FAR 12

RES
QUES
1
1,3
1,3
1,3
1,3
1
1
1
1,2,4
1,2,3,4
1,2,3
1,2,3
2,4
2,4

FAR 15

2,4

Mult-KT
Lim-KT

2,3,4
2,3,4

NTEP
EP
TFNA
CICA
CJ&A
OCI
TforC
ADA
A-Fund
A-Appro
ID/Req
ID/IQ
SBA
PPC
SB/SDB Plan
Dis-A
UniqTC

2,4
2
2
2,4
2,4
2,3
2
2,4
2,4
2,4
2,4
2,4
2
2
2
2,4
2,4

OPERATIONAL
DEFINITIONS
Core or Near Core for Critical Mission or Commodity
High Cost Benefit Tradeoff for Value of Contract
Changing Concurrency
Changing Technology
Changing Technical Orders
Replaces owning asset
Substitute for owned asset
Replaces Owning Facility and Equipment
Service
Commercial
Govt Unique Requirement
Competitive
Services Contract Act
Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 12 Acquisition of
Commercial Items
Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15 Contracting by
Negotiation
Multiple Contract Types
Limited Contract Types (Firm Fixed Price or FFP with
EPA)
Not To Exceed Pricing
Established Pricing
Truth In Negotiations Act
Competition in Contracting Act
Class Justification and Approval
Organizational Conflict of Interest
Termination for Convenience
Anti-Deficiency Act
Availability of Funds Clause
Annual Appropriation
Indefinite Delivery Requirements Contractual Vehicle
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contractual Vehicle
Small Business Administration
Public Private Competition
Small Business and Small Disadvantage Business Plan
Disputes Act
Unique Terms and Conditions
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Table 4 (Continued)
Cont-Bus
F-B&P
Fin-R
Tech-R
I-B&P
R-Buyin
Leg Reg
Sm#Sup
Lg#Sup
LgBus
SmBus
LgBusT
SmBusT
DODSup
PubSup
ComBusB
NcomMkt
HSC
LKB
DP
BC
PR
CT
OT
ST
AT
CE
OE
SE
AE

2,3,4
3
3
3
3
3
2,3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3,4
3,4
3
3
4
4
4
2,4
2,4
2,4
2,4
2,4
2,4
2,4
2,4

Potential for Continued Business
Reduced Future Bid and Proposal Cost
Financial Risk
Technical Risk
Increased Instant Bid and Proposal Cost
Reduced Potential for Buy-in
DOD Legal and Regulatory Environment
Small Number of Suppliers
Large Number of Suppliers
Large Business
Small Business
Team of Large Businesses
Team of Small Businesses
DOD Supplier
Public Supplier
Commercial Business Base
No Commercial Market
High Start-up Cost
Labor Knowledge Barrier
Downsizing Promotion
Base Closure Personnel Moves
Position Eliminated in Downsizing
Commercial Acquisition Procedures Training
Order Contract Training
Services Contract Training
Award Term Incentive Training
Commercial Acquisition Procedures Experience
Order Contract Experience
Services Contract Experience
Award Term Incentive Experience
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Appendix D: Within Case Analysis

This appendix consists of the complete results of all five within case analysis.
Each section addresses only the information gathered from that particular program. The
within case analyses are addressed in no particular order of importance. The presentation
of each of the within cases follows a uniform and set format. Each case is divided into a
background section and into four focus sections. The background section provides
general information about each program, the dollar value of the acquisition, the contract
length, and the experience level of the contracting professionals. The four focus sections
are Nature of the Capability Purchased, Legal and Regulatory Environment, Nature of the
DOD Competitive Market, Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. These sections were
developed from the four research questions. The information in the four focus sections
was open-coded using concept/mind-mapping techniques (Novak, 1998:27 and Buzan &
Buzan, 1994:139). A pictorial representation of the resulting map is presented for each
within case analysis.
Case A
Background. This program is for the acquisition of simulation services where
the supplier maintains ownership of the system. The supplier is responsible for
maintaining system concurrency with the aircraft and for all logistics support of the
system. During acquisition planning, the estimated cost of this program was $806
million. It was determined the benefits of the relationship exceeded the cost of
implementing the relationship. This basic contract is for 7 years with 2 years lead-time to
the commencement of the minimum of 5 years of simulation services. The contract
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provides for 8 annual award term periods that can potentially be earned by the supplier
for a potential contract length of 15 years. Previously earned award term periods may
also be lost based on evaluated supplier performance. Assigned to the program for 2
years, the contracting officer for this case has 16 years of acquisition experience.
Assigned to the program for 2 years, the contract negotiator for this case has 5 years on
contracting experience. Case A's mind map is at figure 11.
Nature of the Capability. The pilot training simulation service is provided on an
individual simulator and is linked locally to same aircraft type simulators. The service
provides the capability to be linked long haul through a network provider to other same
aircraft type simulators and to be linked long haul through a network provider to different
aircraft type simulators. These services were determined to be of a commercial type and
procured under FAR Part 12. However, there is no other customer for this service except
DOD (FMS is not buying the service). This is because of the unique training required
such as flying in formation, air to air tactical mission training, and evasive maneuvers.
There does not currently exist tactical training except in the aircraft.
This simulation service reduces the risk associated with training in the
aircraft. In fact, some training will be completed solely in the simulator because of the
high risk of training the maneuvers in the aircraft. Part of this type of training was
completed in the aircraft and some of the training requirements never existed before.
Previously the government owned the trainers, now the simulation service is contracted
out. The interviewees indicated that having trained pilots to fly missions is near the AF
core capability to perform the mission.
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Figure 11: Case A Open Coded Mind Map
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The suppliers have the technical expertise to provide the pilot training. By
removing the government from the process, the supplier can implement concurrency
upgrades much faster as the manpower is no longer available to manage this activity.
Further, development and procurement money is not available to meet the new
requirement.
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The service for Case A was determined to
be of a commercial type. This determination in turn induced the use of FAR part 12
acquisition procedures. FAR 12 requires agencies to use (FFP) contracts or fixed-price
contracts with economic price adjustment (EPA) for the acquisition of commercial items.
Use of any other contract type to acquire commercial items is prohibited by this
regulation. A FFP type contract was awarded using an indefinite delivery requirements
contractual vehicle.
The budget is very limited for this program. To avoid violating the Antideficiency Act (ADA), the contracting officer decided not to use an EPA. Even if the
service had not been a commercial type, the use of annual 3400 appropriations makes it
too risky for the government to award any cost type contract. Further, the nature of a
requirements contract imposes no obligation on the Government to order any services.
The basis of consideration for contract formation is the government's promise to acquire
these services only from the awarded supplier. An ADA violation as the result of a
termination for convenience is avoided using contractual language limiting recover of
cost only on orders issued and not on terms earned without orders issued. Further, the
contract contains an availability of funds clause.
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To comply with the Competition in Contracting Act, the IPT for Case A solicited,
evaluated, and awarded priced services for all 15 years. The interviewees indicated that
without firm pricing for the entire contract period of performance the same justification
and approval needed to award a sole source contract would have to be secured before
granting the award term extension.
The acquisition planning for this program includes the application of the Services
Contract Act (SCA) which provides for wage adjustments and limits the contract to 5
years. Price adjustments will be made based on union negotiate rates for the technicians.
The IPT is mechanically controlling the total length of the award term extensions that are
on contract at any point in time. There will never be more than 5 years of performance
on contract at anyone time. As years of performance are used up then more are added or
subtracted base on evaluation of supplier performance. This was coordinated with the
AFMC Department of Labor (DOL) Liaison Representative and the Secretary of the Air
Force Staff Judge Advocate Generals (SAF/JAG) office.
As this was a competitive procurement that was conducted under FAR 12 no
certified cost and pricing data or information other than cost and pricing data was
required during source selection. At the time of award of this contract, the government
was prohibited from requiring certified cost and pricing data under the Truth in
Negotiation Act for commercial items. However, in Case A no commercial market
pricing data was available for this service. When pricing contract modifications for this
service, it is difficult for the contracting officer to determine if the price is fair and
reasonable. Because of the potential longer relationship afforded under the award term
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provision, the supplier has voluntarily provided other than cost and pricing data as well as
catalogue data if available to help support the changes process.
Another regulation that affected this government acquisition included
consideration of the small business requirements. The regulations required the EPT to
gain approval from the Small Business Administration not to set-aside the competition to
small or small disadvantaged businesses. Further, small business/small disadvantage
business subcontracting plans were required to be submitted, evaluated, and
administered.
The contract awarded contains several special clauses or government unique
terms and conditions. The most notable special clause is an award term clause allowing
extensions or reductions to the performance period not subject to the Disputes Act.
Second, a special deliveries and performance clause allowing technical insertion
upgrades. Lastly, a system availability accounting clause allowing assignment of award
term points for mean time between failure and the device availability rates that feeds into
the performance evaluation of the award term for system availability. To win the award
the supplier had to agree to the inclusion of the following government unique contract
terms and conditions for commercial items under FAR 52.212-4(r )—
1. comply with 31 U.S.C. 1352 relating to limitations on the use of appropriated
funds to influence certain Federal contracts;
2. 18 U.S.C. 431 relating to officials not to benefit;
3. 40 U.S.C. 327, et seq., Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act;
4. 41 U.S.C. 51-58, Anti-Kickback Act of 1986;
5. 41 U.S.C. 265 and 10 U.S.C. 2409 relating to whistleblower protections;
6. 49 U.S.C. 40118, Fly American; and
7. 41 U.S.C. 423 relating to procurement integrity.
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Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. Pilot simulation training service for
commercial airlines can be acquired on an hourly basis. The number of suppliers of pilot
training in the commercial market is small because of the FAA certification and annual
re-certification requirements. The SAMP identifies there are several offerers interested
in this competition. The number of suppliers for the simulation service acquired under
Case A contained a few of the large DOD contractors. The AF certifies AF owned
devices for training. The AF will remain the certification authority for the simulators that
will provide the service acquired for Case A.
There are high start-up costs to enter this market. The supplier must develop,
integrate interoperability requirements, and produce the devices. The devices must be
tested and certified before an order for the service is issued. Commercial suppliers are
guaranteed a revenue stream for the simulation service. Appropriation law does not allow
us this latitude. The interviewee indicated the supplier is at a tremendous financial risk.
The supplier in Case A did have a competitive edge because they are the producer
of the aircraft and have produced this type of simulator in the past. As the producer of the
aircraft, the supplier will be able to maintain concurrency with the aircraft easier than
another supplier could.
Shifting the risk of concurrency responsibility to the supplier reduces the potential
for buy-in. In the past, suppliers have been able to recoup cost through government
requested change order modifications. Further, pricing the award term extensions reduces
the potential for buy-in. Previously, suppliers have been able to get well from follow-on
procurements.
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Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. The interviewees were the previous contract
negotiator and the current contracting officer/contract negotiator for Case A.
The previous contract negotiator participated on the program for three years and had no
prior experience buying services, using commercial procedures, or using ordering
contracts. The current contracting officer/contract negotiator has been working the
program for eight months and had no prior experience buying services, using commercial
procedures, or using ordering contracts. As the award term incentive concept is new,
neither of these participates have any experience using award term.
The core government IPT for Case A has experience extreme instability. In the
four years since the start of acquisition planning, this program has had four different
contracting officers, four different program managers, two different buyers, and one
engineer. Since award of the contract, the Term Determining Official (TDO) for the
award term has changed twice. It was indicated that downsizing required some IPT
members to move to other inadequately staffed programs. Some IPT members left the
program due to promotions into open positions left vacant from early retirements.
The interviewees have not received or conducted training for the award term
concept and related acquisition concepts other than the award term plan for the contract.
Each of the TDO changes requires training of duties and responsibilities concerning the
award term process. The Award Term Review Board (ATRB) members are assumed to
understand the award term process, as they are familiar with the award fee process.
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CaseB
Background. This program is for the acquisition of mission crew simulation
services where the supplier maintains ownership of the system. The supplier is
responsible for maintaining system concurrency with the aircraft and for all logistics
support of the system. At the time of acquisition planning, the estimated cost of this
program was $131.9 million. It was determined the benefits of the relationship exceeded
the cost of implementing the relationship. The basic contract is for 7 years with 8 annual
award term periods that can potentially be earned by the supplier for a total of 15 years.
Based on evaluated performance, the supplier can lose up to 2 years, of the original 7
years, for a minimum of 5 years. Previously earned award term periods may also be lost
based on evaluated supplier performance. Assigned to the program for 1 month, the
contracting officer for this case has 15 years of acquisition experience. Assigned to the
program for 2 years, the previous contracting officer for this case had 15 years of
acquisition experience. Case B's mind map is at figure 12.
Nature of the Capability. Mission crew simulation services are provided for
multiple sites with a minimum of 14 crew stations and 7 instructor operator stations at
each site. The service provides the capability to be linked long haul through a network
provider to different aircraft type simulators. These services were determined to be of a
commercial type and procured under FAR Part 12. However, there is not a commercial
market for this type of mission training or a known type of commercial mission crew
training service.
The AF has identified the need for other aircraft mission crews to train with pilots
from other aircraft. The AF mission has been negatively impacted due to a lack of
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composite or inter-aircraft training. This type of training fits with in the concept of an
Expeditionary Air Force (EAF). The interviewees indicated that having this training
service is very near the core competency of conducting the AF mission.
In the past, the government owned the simulators. There have been serious delays
in acquiring concurrency upgrades due to budget cuts in development and procurement
money. Now the supplier will own, operate, and upgrade concurrency as needed.
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The service for Case B was determined to
be of a commercial type. This determination in turn induced the use of FAR part 12
acquisition procedures. Part 12 of the FAR requires agencies to use FFP contracts or
fixed-price contracts with EPA for the acquisition of commercial items. Use of any other
contract type to acquire commercial items is prohibited by this regulation. A FFP type
contract was awarded using an indefinite delivery requirements contractual vehicle.
The budget is very limited for this program. To avoid violating the ADA,
the contracting officer decided not to use an EPA. Even if the service had not been a
commercial type, the use of annual 3400 appropriations makes it too risky for the
government to award any cost type contract. Placement of annual orders using annual
appropriation helps avoid ADA violations. Further, the nature of a requirements contract
imposes no obligation on the Government to order any services, which avoids funding
limitation problems. The basis of consideration for contract formation is the
government's promise to acquire these services only from the awarded supplier. An ADA
violation as the result of a termination for convenience is avoided using contractual
language limiting recover of cost only on orders issued and not on terms earned without
orders issued. Further, the contract contains an availability of funds clause.
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The price and service performance requirements were compete for all 15 years to
comply with CICA. The ceiling amount of the contract includes the entire 15 years. The
interviewee indicated that without firm pricing for the entire contract period of
performance the same justification and approval needed to award a sole source contract
would have to be secured before granting the award term extension.
The first contracting officer incorporated the SCA into this contract. The award
of extensions is manually limited to no more than five years at any point in time to avoid
violating the SCA five-year limitation on the length of the contract. However, the current
contracting officers understanding is that the SCA does not limit the length of the
contract to five years. This understanding is based on the DOL interpretation of
extensions to service contracts. The interviewee provided the DOL interpretation as
follows:
Also, whenever the term of an exiting contract is extended, pursuant to an
option clause or otherwise (e.g. award term provision), so that the
contractor furnishes the services over and extended period of time, ra ther
than being granted extra time to fulfill his original commitment, the
extension is considered to be a new contract for purposes of the
application of the Act's provisions. (DOL, 1983: 4.143)
As this was a competitive procurement that was conducted under FAR 12 no
certified cost and pricing data or information other than cost and pricing data was
required during source selection. At the time of award of this contract, the government
was prohibited from requiring certified cost and pricing data under TINA for commercial
items. However, in Case B no commercial market pricing data was available for this
service. When pricing contract modifications for this service, it is difficult for the
contracting officer to determine if the price is fair and reasonable. Because of the

108

potential longer relationship afforded under the award term provision, the buyer and
supplier negotiated an agreement for the supplier to submit information other than cost or
pricing data for within scope modifications. The amount of data the supplier provides is
dependent on the type of change.
Another regulation that affected this government acquisition included
consideration of the small business requirements. The regulations required the IPT to
gain approval from the Small Business Administration not to set-aside the competition to
small or small disadvantaged businesses. Further, small business/small disadvantage
business subcontracting plans were required to be submitted and evaluated for non-small
business offerors. Because a small business won this competition, the contract does not
contain a subcontracting plan. As this was not a set-aside, this small business supplier
does not have to comply with FAR 52.219-14, which would have require the small
business supplier to perform more than 50% of the effort.
The contract awarded contains several special clauses or government unique
terms and conditions. The most notable special clause is an award term clause allowing
extensions or reductions to the performance period not subject to the Disputes Act.
Second, a special deliveries and performance clause allowing technical insertion
upgrades valued up to $50,000 for the first site and $25,000 for all remaining sites within
the contract price. Lastly, a system availability accounting clause allows payments to be
reduced if the system is not 99% available for simulation service. To win the award the
supplier had to agree to the inclusion of the following government unique contract terms
and conditions for commercial items under FAR 52.212-4(r )—
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

comply with 31 U.S.C. 1352 relating to limitations on the use of appropriated
funds to influence certain Federal contracts;
18 U.S.C. 431 relating to officials not to benefit;
40 U.S.C. 327, et seq., Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act;
41 U.S.C. 51-58, Anti-Kickback Act of 1986;
41 U.S.C. 265 and 10 U.S.C. 2409 relating to whistleblower protections;
49 U.S.C. 40118, Fly American; and
41 U.S.C. 423 relating to procurement integrity.

Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. Simulation type training services are
available commercially. However, mission crew simulation service is not available
commercially. There were a small number of supplier teams interested in providing the
mission crew simulation service acquired under Case B.
There are high start-up costs to enter this market. The supplier must develop,
integrate interoperability requirements, and produce the devices. The devices must be
tested before an order for the service is issued. The interviewee indicated the supplier is
at a tremendous financial risk. No potential supplier in Case B had a competitive edge.
Shifting the risk of concurrency responsibility to the supplier reduces the potential
for buy-in. In the past, suppliers have been able to recoup cost through government
requested change order modifications. Further, pricing the award term extensions reduces
the potential for buy-in. Previously, suppliers have been able to get well from follow-on
procurements.
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. The interviewee is currently the contracting
officer/contract negotiator and has participated on the program for one month but works
the same office with as the prior contracting officer and contract negotiators. This
participant has two years experience working with award term contracting on another
procurement. Other related experience in buying services and using ordering contracts,
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but no experience using commercial procedures. The interviewee indicated that training
for commercial procedures was needed. Further, the training offered thus far has been
inadequate because the experience base does not exist in the government. The trainers
provided have not actually used the prescribed commercial procedures.
The core government IPT for Case B has experience extreme instability. In the
two years since the start of acquisition, planning this program has had four different
contracting officers, two different program managers, three different buyers, and two
different engineers. Since award of the contract, the TOO for the award term has not
changed. It was indicated that downsizing required some IPT members to move to other
inadequately staffed programs. Some IPT members left the program due to promotions
into open positions left vacant from early retirements.
The interviewee has provided award term incentive training to the TOO and to the
supplier. The contracting officer knows the ATRB members are familiar with award fee
process and believe they understand the award term process because of the similarities.

CaseC
Background. This program is for the acquisition of network services. The
supplier is responsible for providing the network service that links together distributed
mission training to provide federates with the capability to conduct team training. The
network service includes integration and interconnectivity services as well as daily
operations and support. During acquisition planning, the estimated cost of this program
was $449 million. It was determined the benefits of the relationship exceeded the cost of
implementing the relationship. The basic contract is for 5 years with 11 annual award
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term periods that can potentially be earned by the supplier. Based on evaluated
performance, the supplier can lose up to 2 years, of the original 5 years, for a minimum of
3 years. Previously earned award term periods may also be lost based on evaluated
supplier performance. Assigned to the program for 2 years, the contracting officer for this
case has 15 years of acquisition experience. Assigned to the program for 3 years, the
contract negotiator for this case has 5 years of contracting experience. Case C's mind
map is at figure 13
Nature of the Capability. This network service includes a research and
development effort for related areas like multi-level security. The supplier establishes the
standards and tools so those dissimilar platforms can train together. This type of network
service provides interoperability between different aircraft type of simulators. This
capability provides a network to connect simulators around the world for real-time
distributed training. Network services are available commercially and are not unique to
DOD. The interoperability requirement could not be clearly determined to be of a
commercial type, as the application is considered unique to DOD. The interoperability
requirement and the research and development portion of the acquisition caused the team
to use FAR part 15 procedures to select the supplier.
The cost of composite training is expensive and dangerous. The network service
allows the interaction between different platform pilots and between pilots and mission
crews. Previously we own the simulators with no network training capability. Now
various suppliers will own, operate, and upgrade concurrency. The network service
provides a new capability to train within the concept of EAF. The interviewees indicated
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that having this network service is very near the core competency of conducting the AF
mission.
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The service for Case C was determined to
be unique to the government. This determination in turn induced the use of FAR part 15
acquisition procedures. Part 15 of the FAR allows the use of various types of fixed-price
and cost reimbursement contracts. Using an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity
contractual vehicle, the contract awarded for Case C included FFP, not-to exceed (NTE)
FFP for out year services, time and material (T&M), NTE T&M and cost-plus-fixed-fee
(CPFF) type pricing arrangements.
The budget is very limited for this program. Placement of annual orders using
annual appropriation for the network service will help avoid ADA violations. Further,
the nature of an ordering contract imposes no obligation on the Government to order any
effort beyond the required minimum guaranteed, which avoids funding limitation
problems. The basis of consideration for contract formation is the government's
placement of the minimum order. An ADA violation as the result of a termination for
convenience is avoided using the ID/IQ contractual vehicle, which limits recovery to
issued orders. Further, the contract contains an availability of funds clause.
To comply with CICA, the acquisition strategy for Case C featured full and open
competition with a two-phase down select approach FAR 15 procedures. Multiple
contracts were award. The successful down selected supplier's contract was modified to
incorporate firm prices for the next five years of services (Phase II) and NTE prices for
the additional 11 years of potential award term extensions. Because the award terms did
not include competitively established prices, no extension can be awarded without
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approval of a sole source award. The IPT for Case C is currently seeking approval of a
class J&A to definitize the NTE prices from the Secretary of the Air Force Acquisition
Executive. The class J&A is being requested under the authority of FAR 6.302-1 (a)
(2)(iii) duplicated cost and unacceptable delay in effort highly specialized service.
The interviewees indicated that without firm pricing for the entire contract period of
performance the same justification and approval needed to award a sole source contract
would have to be secured before granting the award term extension.
The SCA does not apply to this contract. The DOL does not may wage
determinations for the professional labor required for this effort. The interviewees
understanding of the DOL's interpretation of the SCA is that the contract length
would not be limited to 5 years even if the SCA did apply.
Adequate competition allowed limited cost and pricing data to be requested
during the source selection and the down select activities. TINA applies and the
Government uses certified cost and pricing data for modifications and defmitization of
the NTE prices. Because technology is changing rapidly, the net cost will continue to
decline. The NTE prices protected the government and the supplier from locking in firm
prices too early. A maximum of five years into the future will be definitized. The award
term plan evaluation incentivizes complete and accurate proposals through rating
responsiveness to request for proposals.
Another regulation that affected this government acquisition included
consideration of the small business requirements. The regulations required the IPT to
gain approval from the Small Business Administration not to set-aside the competition to
small or small disadvantaged businesses. A small business and small disadvantage
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business comprehensive subcontracting plan is included in the contract for Case C.
Further, the award term plan incentivizes the supplier to exceed socioeconomic program
goals.
The contract awarded contains several special clauses or government unique
terms and conditions. The most notable special clause is an award term clause allowing
extensions or reductions to the performance period. Case E's award term clause does not
exempt it from the Disputes Act. A down select clause allows the government to reduce
the number of suppliers to a single source following the Phase 1 risk reduction effort. A
special payment procedure similar to performance based payments allows annually priced
connectivity to be paid monthly. The DOD requirement to use the Defense Information
Service Network (DISN) as the network architecture has been deferred. The requirement
will be reviewed after three years of network service at which time the supplier may be
required to use the DISN network architecture to provide the connectivity service. A
DISN clause allows the government to direct the supplier to provided the connectivity
using DISN and allows the change to be negotiate using this clause as the authority. To
win the award the supplier had to agree to the inclusion of the government unique
organizational conflict of interest (OCI) clause. This clause is required because the
supplier for Case C is establishing standards and defines the network interface
requirements for the other suppliers of simulation services. Further, the network supplier
can be a technical advisor in future simulation services source selections.
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. A large commercial market exists for
information technology and networking services. The SAMP identifies there are a large
number of potential offerors interested in this competition. The market is characterized

116

by a large number of suppliers varying in size from large businesses to very small
businesses.
The network market has few entry barriers and has relatively low start-up cost.
The performance requirements for Case C are unique to the government and have not
been previously procured. No potential supplier in Case C had a competitive edge. Full
and open competition opportunities existed for the initial multiple awarded Phase 1 and
for the down select single awarded Phase 2. However, the OCI clause caused potential
offerors not to propose because it would limit future simulation services opportunities.
The interviewee indicated there was potential for offerors to buy-in for this
service. Offerors attempted to move FFP and FFP NTE efforts to the T&M and NTE
T&M and to the CPFF efforts in their proposed statements of work from the government
statement of objectives. Numerous evaluation notices were issued and face-to-face
discussions were conducted during source selection to counteract the buy-in attempts.
Further, discussion were conducted at the Air Force base and at multiple suppliers'
facilities during Phase 1 to ensure the task were proposed for Phase 2 under the correct
contract line items. Further, the NTE pricing with downward only adjustments for the
award term extensions reduces the potential for buy -in.
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. The interviewees were the previous contract
negotiator and the current contracting officer/contract negotiator for Case C. The
previous contract negotiator participated on the program for three years and had no prior
experience buying services, using commercial procedures, or using ordering contracts.
The current contracting officer/contract negotiator has been working the program for the
past three years and has experience in buying services and using ordering contracts, but
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no experience using commercial procedures or using multiple contract types. As the
award term incentive concept is new, neither of these participates had prior experience in
its use.
The core government IPT for Case C has experience extreme instability. In the
four years since the start of acquisition planning, this program has had two different
contracting officers, four different program managers, and three different contract
negotiators. The large staff of five engineers has remained stable. The TDO has not
changes since the down select to a single supplier. It was indicated that downsizing
required some IPT members to move to other inadequately staffed programs. Some IPT
members left the program due to promotions into open positions left vacant from early
retirements.
The interviewee has provided award term incentive training to the TDO and to the
supplier. The contracting officer knows the ATRB members are familiar with award fee
process and believe they understand the award term process because of the similarities.

CaseD
Background. This program is for the acquisition of pilot simulation services
where the supplier maintains ownership of the system. The supplier is responsible for
maintaining system concurrency with the aircraft and for all logistics support of the
system. At the time of acquisition planning, the estimated cost of this program was $605
million. It was determined the benefits of the relationship exceeded the cost of
implementing the relationship. The basic contract is for 7 years with 8 annual award term
periods that can potentially be earned by the supplier for a total of 15 years. Based on
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evaluated performance, the supplier can lose up to 2 years, of the original 7 years, for a
minimum of 5 years. Previously earned award term periods may also be lost based on
evaluated supplier performance. Assigned to the program for 2 years, the contracting
officer for this case has 16 years of acquisition experience. Case D's mind map is at
figure 14.
Nature of the Capability. This program procures availability of pilot training
simulation services. The simulation service is provided on an individual simulator and is
linked locally to same aircraft type simulators. The service provides the capability to be
linked long haul through a network provider to other same aircraft type simulators and to
be linked long haul through a network provider to different aircraft type simulators.
These services were determined to be of a commercial type and procured under FAR Part
12. DOD is currently the only customer of this service. However, there is a potential
FMS market for this type of simulation service. This is because of the unique training
required such as flying in formation, air to air tactical mission training, and evasive
maneuvers. There does not currently exist tactical training except in the aircraft.
Procuring availability of simulation type training as a service reduces the risk
associated with training in the aircraft. In fact, some training will be completed solely in
the simulator because of the high risk of some training the maneuvers in the aircraft or of
using destructive weapons. Some of the training used to be completed in the aircraft and
some of the training requirements never existed before. Previously we own the trainers,
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now we are contracting for the availability of the service. The interviewee indicated that
having trained pilots to fly missions is near the AF core capability to perform the mission.
The suppliers have the technical expertise or can hire subject matter experts to
provide the simulation service. By removing the Government from the process, the
supplier can implement concurrency upgrades much faster as we no longer have the
manpower. Further, there was no development and procurement money available to
maintain concurrency or to meet the new interoperability training requirement.
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The service for Case D was determined to
be of a commercial type. This determination in turn induced the use of FAR part 12
acquisition procedures. Part 12 of the FAR requires agencies to use FFP contracts or
fixed-price contracts with EPA for the acquisition of commercial items. Use of any other
contract type to acquire commercial items is prohibited by this regulation. A FFP type
contract was awarded using an indefinite delivery requirements contractual vehicle.
The budget is very limited for this program. To avoid violating the ADA, the
contracting officer decided not to use an EPA. Even if the service had not been a
commercial type, the use of annual 3400 appropriations makes it too risky for the
government to award any cost type contract. Placement of annual orders using annual
appropriation helps avoid ADA violations. Further, the nature of a requirements contract
imposes no obligation on the Government to order any services, which avoids funding
limitation problems. The basis of consideration for contract formation is the
government's promise to acquire these services only from the awarded supplier. An ADA
violation as the result of a termination for convenience is avoided using contractual
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language limiting recover of cost only on orders issued and not on terms earned without
orders issued. Further, the contract contains an availability of funds clause.
To comply with CICA, the Case D synopsized and competed the service
performance requirements for all 15 years. The ceiling amount of the contract includes
the entire 15 years. The interviewee indicated that without firm pricing for the entire
contract period of performance the same justification and approval needed to award a
sole source contract would have to be secured before granting the award term extension.
The acquisition planning for this program includes the application of the SCA,
which provides for wage adjustments and limits the contract to five years. Price
adjustments will be made based on union negotiate rates for the technicians. The IPT is
mechanically controlling the total length of the award term extensions that are on contract
at any point in time. There will never be more than five years of performance on contract
at anyone time. As years of performance are used up then more are added or subtracted
base on evaluation of supplier performance. This was coordinated with the AFMC
Department of Labor (DOL) Liaison Representative and the Secretary of the Air Force
Staff Judge Advocate Generals (SAF/JAG) office.
As this was a competitive procurement that was conducted under FAR 12 no
certified cost and pricing data or information other than cost and pricing data was
required during source selection. At the time of award of this contract, the government
was prohibited from requiring certified cost and pricing data under TINA for commercial
items. However, in Case D no commercial market pricing data was available for this
service. When pricing contract modifications for this service, it is difficult for the
contracting officer to determine if the price is fair and reasonable. Because of the
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potential longer relationship afforded under the award term provision, the supplier has
voluntarily provided other than cost and pricing data as well as catalogue data if available
to help support the changes process.
Another regulation that affected this government acquisition included
consideration of the small business requirements. The regulations required the IPT to
gain approval from the Small Business Administration not to set-aside the competition to
small or small disadvantaged businesses. Further, small business/small disadvantage
business subcontracting plans were required to be submitted, evaluated, and
administered.
The contract awarded contains several special clauses or government unique
terms and conditions. The most notable special clause is an award term clause allowing
extensions or reductions to the performance period not subject to the Disputes Act.
Second, a special deliveries and performance clause allowing technical insertion
upgrades. Lastly, a system availability accounting clause allowing assignment of award
term points for mean time between failure and the device availability rates that feeds into
the performance evaluation of the award term for system availability. To win the award
the supplier had to agree to the inclusion of the following government unique contract
terms and conditions for commercial items under FAR 52.212-4(r )—
1. comply with 31 U.S.C. 1352 relating to limitations on the use of appropriated
funds to influence certain Federal contracts;
2. 18 U.S.C. 431 relating to officials not to benefit;
3. 40 U.S.C. 327, et seq., Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act;
4. 41 U.S.C. 51-58, Anti-Kickback Act of 1986;
5. 41 U.S.C. 265 and 10 U.S.C. 2409 relating to whistleblower protections;
6. 49 U.S.C. 40118, Fly American; and
7. 41 U.S.C. 423 relating to procurement integrity.
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Nature of the DOD Competitive Market._ Pilot simulation training service for
commercial airlines can be acquired on an hourly basis. The number of suppliers of pilot
training in the commercial market is small because of the FAA certification and annual
re-certification requirements. The number of suppliers for the simulation service
acquired under Case D contained a few of the large DOD contractors. The AF certifies
AF owned devices for training. The AF will remain the certification authority for the
simulators that will provide the service acquired for Case D.
There are high start-up costs to enter this market. The supplier must develop,
integrate interoperability requirements, and produce the devices. The devices must be
tested and certified before an order for the service is issued. Commercial suppliers are
guaranteed a revenue stream for the simulation service. Appropriation law does not allow
us this latitude. The interviewee indicated the supplier is at a tremendous financial risk.
The supplier in Case D did have a competitive edge because they are the producer
of the aircraft and have produced this type of simulator in the past. As the producer of the
aircraft, the supplier will be able to maintain concurrency with the aircraft easier than
another supplier could.
Shifting the risk of concurrency responsibility to the supplier reduces the potential
for buy-in. In the past, suppliers have been able to recoup cost through government
requested change order modifications. Further, pricing the award term extensions reduces
the potential for buy-in. Previously, suppliers have been able to get well from follow-on
procurements.
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities. The interviewee was the contract negotiator
before contract award and is currently the contracting officer/contract negotiator for Case

124

D. This participant has been working the program for two years and had no prior
experience buying services, using commercial procedures, or using ordering contracts.
The participant had no experience using award term, as this is a new concept.
The core government IPT for Case D experienced some instability. From the
stare of the program two years ago, this program has had two different contracting
officers, two different program managers, two different contract negotiators, and two
different engineers. Since award of the contract, the Term Determining Official (TDO)
for the award term has changed twice. It was indicated that downsizing required some
IPT members to move to other inadequately staffed programs. Some IPT members left
the program due to promotions into open positions left vacant from early retirements.
The interviewee has not received or conducted training for the award term
concept and related acquisition concepts other than the award term plan for the contract.
Each of the TDO changes requires training of duties and responsibilities concerning the
award term process, but was provided by another IPT. The Award Term Review Board
(ATRB) members are assumed to understand the award term process, as they are familiar
with the award fee process.

CaseE
Background. This program is for the acquisition of aircraft engine overhaul and
repair services. The supplier is responsible for scheduled overhaul maintenance and for
diagnoses and repair. At the time of contract award, the estimated cost of this program
was $10 billion. It was determined the benefits of the relationship exceeded the cost of
implementing the relationship. The basic contract is for 7 years with 8 annual award term
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periods that can potentially be earned by the supplier for a total of 15 years. Based on
evaluated performance, the supplier can lose up to 2 years, of the original 7 years, for a
minimum of 5 years. Previously earned award term periods may also be lost based on
evaluated supplier performance. Assigned to the program for 4 years, the contracting
officer for this case has 28 years of acquisition experience. Case E's mind map is at
figure 15.
Nature of the Capability. This program is for the procurement of aircraft engine
overhaul and repair services. The service includes scheduled maintenance, diagnostic
efforts, and repair of inoperable equipment for three different types of engines. Two of
the types of engine overhaul and repair services are available commercially. One of the
types of engine overhaul and repair service is not available commercially, but the service
was determined to be of a commercial type.
This capability was previously provided by an AF Air Logistic Center that was
closed under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act of 1995. This service was
considered for outsourcing as the act provided for a public/ private competition.
Therefore, the supplier selection and evaluation processes followed FAR part 12 for
private offerers and resembled a FAR part 15 for the public offerer team.
The capability of maintaining and repairing weapon system and airlift systems
engines was considered by the acquisition team to be near the AF core mission. The
service in critical to supporting two near simultaneous regional conflicts.
Legal and Regulatory Environment. The service for Case E was determined to
be of a commercial type. This determination in turn induced the use of FAR part 12
acquisition procedures for private offerers. Part 12 of the FAR requires agencies to use
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FFP contracts or fixed-price contracts with EPA for the acquisition of commercial items.
However, the public offeror was required to submit cost and pricing data with no profit
for the public offeror. In an attempt to maintain the spirit of commercial acquisition, a FP
(no profit) with EPA type contract was awarded to the public offeror using an indefinite
delivery requirements contractual vehicle. The public supplier of this effort issued a FFP
with EPA type contract to their industry team member
The ADA does not apply to the public offeror, but does apply to the
private team member. The use of annual 3400 appropriations makes it too risky for the
government to award any cost type contract. Placement of annual orders using annual
appropriation helps avoid ADA violations. The basis of consideration for contract
formation is the government's promise to acquire these services only from the awarded
supplier. The nature of a requirements contract imposes no obligation on the government
to order a minimum amount of services. No special termination for convenience language
was included excluding cost incurred to earn award terms. The contract contains an
availability of funds clause. However, special provision was included to guarantee the
supplier team five years of workload. If the contract team was terminated before the end
of five years of orders, the government may incur a termination liability from the
supplier's private teammate. As Case E's contract is funded with a 3400 annual
appropriation, this could lead to an ADA violation.
To comply with CICA, the IPT for Case E synopsized and competed the service
performance requirements for all 15 years. The ceiling amount of the contract includes
the entire 15 years. The interviewee indicated that without firm pricing for the entire
contract period of performance the same justification and approval needed to award a
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sole source contract would have to be secured before granting the award term extension.
The interviewee noted that if this were not a government procurement, offerors would not
be required to provide prices now to establish the long-term relationship.
The SCA does not apply to repair and overhaul. The AFMC FAR supplement
considers engine overhaul programs to be of the scope of a rebuilding or of a
reconditioning effort that constitutes a re-manufacturing effort. Re-manufacturing efforts
are not covered by the SCA.
As this was a competitive procurement that was conducted under FAR 12 no
certified cost and pricing data or information other than cost and pricing data was
required from any private offeror during source selection. TINA did not apply to the
public offeror during source selection or after award. However, in Case E commercial
market pricing data and historical cost data was available for this service. Because the
supplier is public provider, requests for equitable adjustment are substantiate with
information other than cost or pricing data.
Another regulation that affected this government acquisition included
consideration of the small business requirements. Because the BRAC Act of 1995
directed this public/private competition, the SBA did not consider the effort for set-aside.
Small business/small disadvantage business subcontracting plans were required to be
submitted, evaluated, and administered.
The contract awarded contains several special clauses or government unique
terms and conditions. The most notable special clause is an award term clause allowing
extensions or reductions to the performance period not subject to the Disputes Act. The
EPA clause allows downward only price adjustments. A workload volume guarantee
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clause allows supplier to submit REA if the volume changes greater than plus or minus
25%. A clause notifies the supplier, at its own risk, it can induct and repair an item before
the issuance of an order.
Nature of the DOD Competitive Market. This type of engine overhaul and
repair service is commercially available. The number of license issued by the original
equipment manufacturer limits the number of commercial suppliers. Only one public
offeror was identified in the BRAC Act of 1995. Potentially numerous private suppliers
could have competed for this service. All of the potential private suppliers were DOD
contractors. Most suppliers develop teaming arrangements. According to the
interviewee, some potential offerors dropped out of the competition due to the high cost
of proposing or on the belief they would not be competitive. The winner was the public
offeror with a major weapon systems manufacturer as a partner.
The interviewee contends no offeror had a technical competitive advantage over
other offerors. However, one offeror a team included several original equipment
manufacturers and another team included with licensed equipment maintenance
members. Government furnished equipment and facilities were offered to all. All
suppliers were provided access to hire experienced government employees.
The interviewee believes the long-term nature of the award term incentive
concept reduces the potential for buy-in. Previously, suppliers have been able to get well
from follow-on contracts. The FFP with downward only EPA contract type further
reduced the potential for buy-in.
Acquisition Corps' Capabilities., The interviewee was the contracting officer for
three years before award and one year after award for Case E. This participant has prior
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experience buying services, using commercial procedures, and using ordering contracts.
As the award term incentive concept is new, the participant did not have any experience
using award term.
The core government IPT for Case E was very stable for the three years before
award. Members of the IPT were denied special training opportunities and job rotations
in order to maintain team cohesiveness for the largest contract using the new award term
contract. Shortly following award of the contract, the IPT experienced 100% turnover of
the team membership. This was due to permanent change of station assignments, long
term school attendance, and job reassignments. The current IPT will soon see another
dramatic turnover of personnel because the base is closing and some team members will
not move to the new base that will be administering the program activities. The TDO for
the award term has not changed. Another chairperson of the ATRB will be assigned
when the program administration activities are moved to the new base.
The interviewee has not received or conducted formal training for the award term
concept. Example documents have been provided to Navy and Army acquisition
professional. Award term evaluation training was conducted with the EPT, the
administrative contracting officer, and the customers.
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